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Abstract
Predicate encryption is a new paradigm of public key encryption that enables searches on encrypted data.
Using the predicate encryption, we can search keywords or attributes on encrypted data without decrypting
the ciphertexts. In predicate encryption, a ciphertext is associated with attributes and a token corresponds to
a predicate. The token that corresponds to a predicate f can decrypt the ciphertext associated with attributes
x if and only if f (x) = 1. Hidden vector encryption (HVE) is a special kind of predicate encryption. HVE
supports the evaluation of conjunctive equality, comparison, and subset operations between attributes in
ciphertexts and attributes in tokens. Currently, several HVE schemes were proposed where the ciphertext
size, the token size, and the decryption cost are proportional to the number of attributes in the ciphertext. In
this thesis, we consider the efficiency, the generality, and the security of HVE schemes. The results of this
thesis are described as follows.
The first results of this thesis are efficient HVE schemes where the token consists of just four group
elements and the decryption only requires four bilinear map computations, independent of the number of
attributes in the ciphertext. The construction uses composite order bilinear groups and is selectively secure
under the well-known assumptions. The second results are efficient HVE schemes that are secure under
any kind of pairing types. To achieve our goals, we proposed a general framework that converts HVE
schemes from composite order bilinear groups to prime order bilinear groups. Using the framework, we
convert the previous HVE schemes from composite order bilinear groups to prime order bilinear groups.
The third results are fully secure HVE schemes with short tokens. Previous HVE schemes were proven to
be secure only in the selective security model where the capabilities of the adversaries are severely restricted.
Using the dual system encryption techniques, we construct fully secure HVE schemes with match revealing
property in composite order groups.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview
Public-key encryption is one of the most fundamental primitives in modern cryptography. In public-key en-
cryption, a sender encrypts a message M under a public key PK, and the receiver who has a private key SK
that corresponds to the public key PK can only decrypt the ciphertext. This simple “all-or-nothing” seman-
tics for decryption is sufficient for traditional secure communication systems. However, as the applications
of public-key encryption come to be various, a more complex semantics for decryption is necessary to spec-
ify the set of receivers. For instance, suppose that the ciphertexts associated with keywords are in a database
server, and a user who has permission to read the ciphertexts that are associated with some keywords may
want to decrypt that ciphertexts. Predicate encryption provides this kind of complex semantics in public-key
encryption. In predicate encryption, a ciphertext is associated with attributes and a token corresponds to a
predicate. The token TK f that corresponds to a predicate f can decrypt the ciphertext CT that is associated
with attributes x if and only if f (x) = 1. A ciphertext in predicate encryption hides not only a message
M but also attributes x. Currently, the expressiveness of predicates in predicate encryption is limited. The
most expressive predicate encryption scheme is the one proposed by Katz, Sahai, and Waters in [24], and it
supports inner product predicates.
Predicate encryption enables efficient data processing in the cloud computing systems where users’ data
is stored in un-trusted remote servers. In the case of traditional public-key encryption, a user encrypts
messages and then uploads the ciphertexts to the remote servers. If the user needs information about the
ciphertexts, then he should download all the ciphertexts from the remote servers to decrypt them. Thus,
this approach demands unnecessary data transfers and data decryption. In the case of predicate encryption,
a user creates ciphertexts that are associated with related attributes x and then stores them in the remote
servers. If the user wishes to acquire information about the ciphertexts, then he generates a token TK f that
matches a predicate f and transfers the token to the remote server. Next the remote server retrieves all the
ciphertexts that satisfy f (x) = 1 using the token TK f by evaluating f (x), and then it returns the retrieved
ciphertexts to the user. In this case, the remote server cannot learn any information except the boolean value
of f (x).
Hidden vector encryption (HVE) is a particular kind of predicate encryption and it was introduced
by Boneh and Waters [13]. HVE supports evaluations of conjunctive equality, comparison, and subset
predicates on encrypted data. For example, if a ciphertext is associated with a vector x = (x1, . . . ,xl) of
attributes and a token is associated with a vector σ = (σ1, . . . ,σl) of attributes where an attribute is in
a set Σ, then it can evaluate predicates like (xi = σi), (xi ≥ σ), and (xi ∈ A) where A is a subset of Σ.
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Additionally, it supports conjunctive combination of these primitive predicates by extending the size of
ciphertexts. After the introduction of HVE based on composite order bilinear groups, several HVE schemes
have been proposed in [23,24,29,36]. Katz, Sahai, and Waters [24] proposed a predicate encryption scheme
that supports inner product predicates and they showed that it implies an HVE scheme. Shi and Waters [36]
presented a delegatable HVE scheme that enables the delegation of user’s capabilities to others, and they
showed that it implies an anonymous hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE) scheme. Iovino and
Persiano [23] constructed an HVE scheme based on prime order bilinear groups, but the number of attributes
in Σ is restricted when it is compared to other HVE schemes. Okamoto and Takashima [29] proposed a
hierarchical predicate encryption scheme for inner products under prime order bilinear groups, and it also
implies an HVE scheme.
1.2 Our Motivations
When cryptographic schemes are applied to the real applications, they should be efficient and secure against
strong adversaries. To meet this requirements, we should consider the three issues of efficiency, generality,
and security.
The first issue is the efficiency. Generally efficiency is measured in terms of the size of ciphertexts and
the cost of search operations. If the size of ciphertexts in previous HVE schemes is considered, the number of
ciphertext elements is proportional to the number of attributes in ciphertexts, and the size of group elements
of ciphertexts is proportional to the size of group order. If the cost of search operations is considered, the
number of pairing operations is proportional to the number of token elements. Therefore, it is important to
shorten the number of token elements to reduce the cost of search operations. Additionally, it is better to use
prime order bilinear groups than to use composite order bilinear groups in terms of efficiency.
The second issue is the generality such that the HVE schemes can be based on any kind of pairing types.
Pairing in bilinear groups is classified as three types [17]. Bilinear groups with Type 1 pairing corresponds
to symmetric bilinear groups, and bilinear groups with Type 2 or Type 3 pairing correspond to asymmetric
bilinear groups. The previous HVE schemes were constructed under composite order bilinear groups that
exist in Type 1 pairing, or under asymmetric bilinear groups of prime order. The problem of cryptographic
scheme’s dependency to specific pairing types is that the cryptographic scheme can be useless if a successful
attack for a specific pairing type is found. The solution for this problem is to design a cryptographic scheme
to be independent of a specific pairing type. That is, the cryptographic scheme should have generality that it
is secure under any kind of pairing types. Thus, if a security weakness of some pairing types is found, then
the security of the scheme is guaranteed by just replacing the underlying pairing type without re-designing
the cryptographic scheme. However, it is an open problem to construct an efficient HVE scheme that is
secure under any kind of pairing types.
The third issue is the security such that the HVE schemes should be secure against strong adversaries.
The security models of HVE are categorized as two kinds: the selective security model and the full security
model. In the selective security model, an adversary should commit target vectors before he receive a public
key. Thus, this model severely restricts the capability of the adversary. In the full security model, the
adversary commits target vectors at the challenge stage. The previous HVE schemes were proved in the
selective security model since it is easy to prove its security in this model. However, the right security
model for HVE is the full security model that does not restrict the ability of the adversary. Therefore, it is
an important problem to design an HVE scheme that is secure in the full security model.
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1.3 Our Contributions
The results of this thesis are divided as three folds. The detailed results are described as follows.
Our first results are efficient HVE scheme with short tokens. In composite order bilinear groups, we
constructed HVE schemes that have the constant size of tokens and the constant cost of pairing operations,
and we proved its selective security under the decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) and the decisional
Composite 3-Party Diffie-Hellman (C3DH) assumptions. The ciphertext consists of l+O(1) group ele-
ments, the token consists of four group elements, and the decryption requires four pairing computations.
Though our construction in composite order bilinear groups is algebraically similar to the one by Shi and
Waters in [36], we achieved the constant size of tokens and the constant cost of decryption, in contrast to
the construction of Shi and Waters. Additionally, we converted our construction in composite order groups
to asymmetric bilinear groups of prime order where isomorphisms between two groups are not efficiently
computable.
Our second results are efficient HVE schemes that are secure under any kind of pairing types. To achieve
our goals, we proposed a general framework that converts HVE schemes from composite order bilinear
groups to prime order bilinear groups. The conversion method of this paper is similar to the conversion
method of Freeman in terms of using product groups and vector orthogonality, but it has the following three
differences. The first difference is that Freeman’s method is related to the subgroup decision (SGD) assump-
tion in prime order bilinear groups, whereas our method is not related to the SGD assumption. The second
difference is that Freeman’s method only works in asymmetric bilinear groups of prime order, whereas our
method works in any bilinear groups of prime order. The third difference is that the cryptographic schemes
from Freeman’s method use complex assumptions that depend on complex basis vectors, whereas the HVE
schemes from our method use simple assumptions that are independent of basis vectors. We first convert
the HVE scheme of Boneh and Waters, the delegatable HVE scheme of Shi and Waters, and the efficient
HVE scheme with constant cost of pairing of Lee and Lee from composite order bilinear groups to prime
order bilinear groups. Next we prove that these converted HVE schemes are selectively secure under the
decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) and the decisional Parallel 3-party Diffie-Hellman (P3DH) as-
sumptions. Through these conversion, we constructed the first delegatable HVE scheme and efficient HVE
scheme with constant cost of pairing in any bilinear groups of prime order.
Our third results are fully secure HVE schemes with short tokens. To construct fully secure HVE
schemes, we adapt the dual system encryption technique of Waters [28, 40]. In the dual system encryption,
the ciphertexts and tokens can be a normal-type or a semi-functional type. The dual system encryption
technique achieves the full security model by using two properties such that the normal-type and the semi-
functional type are indistinguishable and the decryption of the semi-functional ciphertext using the semi-
functional token always fails. We propose a fully secure HVE scheme with short tokens in composite order
bilinear groups with four primes.
1.4 Related Works
Predicate encryption in public-key encryption was presented by Boneh et al. [7]. They proposed a public-
key encryption scheme with keyword search (PEKS) using Boneh and Franklin’s identity-based encryption
(IBE) scheme [8, 9], and their construction corresponds to the implementation of an equality predicate.
Abdalla et al. [1] proved that anonymous IBE implies predicate encryption of an equality query, and they
proposed the definition of anonymous HIBE by extending anonymous IBE. Several anonymous HIBE con-
structions were proposed in [14, 33, 36]. A predicate encryption scheme for a comparison query was con-
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structed by Boneh et al. in [11, 12], and it can be used to construct a fully collusion resistant traitor tracing
scheme. By extending comparison predicates, Shi et al. [35] considered multi-dimensional range predicates
on encrypted data under a weaker security model.
Research on predicate encryption was dramatically advanced by the introduction of HVE by Boneh and
Waters [13]. An HVE scheme is a predicate encryption scheme of conjunctive equality, comparison, and
subset predicates. After that, Shi and Waters [36] presented the definition of the delegation in predicate
encryption, and they proposed a delegatable HVE scheme. Iovino and Persiano [23] constructed an HVE
scheme based on prime order bilinear groups with a restricted number of attributes. Katz, Sahai, and Wa-
ters [24] proposed the most expressive predicate encryption scheme of inner product predicates, and they
showed that it implies anonymous IBE, HVE, and predicate encryption for disjunctions, polynomials, CNF
& DNF formulas, or threshold predicates. Okamoto and Takashima [29] constructed a hierarchical predi-
cate encryption scheme for inner products under prime order bilinear groups using the notion of dual pairing
vector spaces.
Predicate encryption in symmetric encryption was considered by Goldreich and Ostrovsky [21]. Song
et al. [38] proposed an efficient scheme that supports an equality predicate. Shen, Shi, and Waters [34]
introduced the formal definition of predicate privacy, and they presented a symmetric predicate encryption
scheme with predicate privacy of inner product predicates using composite order bilinear groups. Blundo
et al. [4] proposed a symmetric HVE scheme that provides weaker predicate privacy under prime order
asymmetric bilinear groups.
Other research direction that is related with predicate encryption is functional encryption. In functional
encryption, a ciphertext is associated with attributes x, and a private key is associated with a function f . If
f (x) = 1, then a receiver who has a private key that corresponds to the function f can decrypt the ciphertext
that corresponds to attributes x. The main difference between predicate encryption and functional encryption
is that the attribute hiding property is not provided in functional encryption, whereas the attribute hiding
property was the essential one in predicate encryption. The identity-based encryption (IBE) is the most
simple type of functional encryption, and it provide an equality function for an identity in ciphertexts [5,
8, 9, 19, 39]. The hierarchical IBE (HIBE) is an extension of IBE, and it provides a conjunctive equality
function for a hierarchical identity in ciphertexts [5, 6, 14, 20, 28, 33, 40]. The attribute-based encryption
(ABE) is also an extension of IBE, and it provides the most general function that consists of AND, OR,
NOT, and threshold gates [3, 22, 27, 30, 32].
7
Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter, we define HVE and give the formal definition of its security model. Then we give the
necessary background on bilinear groups and complexity assumptions.
2.1 Hidden Vector Encryption
Let Σ be a finite set of attributes and let ∗ be a special symbol not in Σ. Define Σ∗ = Σ∪{∗}. The star ∗
plays the role of a wild card or “don’t care” value. For a vector σ = (σ1, . . . ,σl) ∈ Σ
l
∗, we define a predicate
fσ over Σ
l as follows: For x = (x1, . . . ,xl) ∈ Σ
l , it set fσ (x) = 1 if ∀i : (σi = xi or σi = ∗), it set fσ (x) = 0
otherwise.
An HVE scheme consists of four algorithms (Setup, GenToken, Encrypt, Query). Formally it is
defined as:
Setup(1λ ). The setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter 1λ . It outputs a public key PK and a
secret key SK.
GenToken(σ ,SK,PK). The token generation algorithm takes as input a vector σ = (σ1, . . . ,σl) ∈ Σ
l
∗ that
corresponds to a predicate fσ , the secret key SK and the public key PK. It outputs a token TKσ for
the vector σ .
Encrypt(x,M,PK). The encrypt algorithm takes as input a vector x= (x1, . . . ,xl) ∈ Σ
l , a message M ∈M,
and the public key PK. It outputs a ciphertext CT for x and M.
Query(CT,TKσ ,PK). The query algorithm takes as input a ciphertext CT, a token TKσ for a vector σ
that corresponds to a predicate fσ , and the public key PK. It outputs M if fσ (x) = 1 or outputs ⊥
otherwise.
The scheme should satisfy the following correctness property: for all x∈Σl ,M ∈M, σ ∈Σl∗, let (PK,SK)←
Setup(1λ ), CT← Encrypt(x,M,PK), and TKσ ←GenToken(σ ,SK,PK).
• If fσ (x) = 1, then Query(CT,TKσ ,PK) =M.
• If fσ (x) = 0, then Query(CT,TKσ ,PK) =⊥ with all but negligible probability.
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2.2 Security Model
2.2.1 Selective Security Model
We define the selective security model of HVE as the following game between a challenger C and an adver-
sary A:
Init: A submits two vectors x0,x1 ∈ Σ
l .
Setup: C runs the setup algorithm and keeps the secret key SK to itself, then it gives the public key PK to
A.
Query 1: A adaptively requests a polynomial number of tokens for vectors σ1, . . . ,σq1 that correspond to
predicates fσ1 , . . . , fσq1 subject to the restriction that fσi(x0) = fσi(x1) for all i. In responses, C gives
the corresponding tokens TKσi to A.
Challenge: A submits two messages M0,M1 subject to the restriction that if there is an index i such that
fσi(x0) = fσi(x1) = 1 thenM0 =M1. C chooses a random coin γ and gives a ciphertext CT of (xγ ,Mγ)
to A.
Query 2: A continues to request tokens for vectors σq1+1, . . . ,σq that correspond to predicates fσq1+1 , . . . , fσq
subject to the two restrictions as before.
Guess: A outputs a guess γ ′. If γ = γ ′, it outputs 0. Otherwise, it outputs 1.
The advantage of A is defined as AdvHVEA =
∣∣Pr[γ = γ ′]−1/2∣∣ where the probability is taken over the coin
tosses made by A and C.
Definition 2.2.1. We say that an HVE scheme is selectively secure if all probabilistic polynomial-time
adversaries have at most a negligible advantage in the above game.
2.2.2 Full Security Model
We define the full security model of HVE as the following game between a challenger C and an adversary
A:
Setup: C runs the setup algorithm and keeps the secret key SK to itself, then it gives the public key PK to
A.
Query 1: A adaptively requests a polynomial number of tokens for vectors σ1, . . . ,σq1 that correspond to
predicates fσ1 , . . . , fσq1 . In responses, C gives the corresponding tokens TKσi to A.
Challenge: A submits two vectors x0,x1 ∈ Σ
l and two messages M0,M1 subject to the following two re-
strictions:
• For all i ∈ {1, . . . ,q1}, fσi(x0) = fσi(x1).
• If ∃i ∈ {1, . . . ,q1} such that fσi(x0) = fσi(x1) = 1, then M0 =M1.
Query 2: A continues to request tokens for vectors σq1+1, . . . ,σq that correspond to predicates fσq1+1 , . . . , fσq
subject to the two restrictions as before.
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Guess: A outputs a guess γ ′. If γ = γ ′, it outputs 0. Otherwise, it outputs 1.
The advantage of A is defined as AdvHVEA =
∣∣Pr[γ = γ ′]−1/2∣∣ where the probability is taken over the coin
tosses made by A and C.
Definition 2.2.2. We say that an HVE scheme is fully secure (with match concealing) if all probabilistic
polynomial-time adversaries have at most a negligible advantage in the above game.
Definition 2.2.3. We say that an HVE scheme is fully secure (with match revealing) if all probabilistic
polynomial-time adversaries have at most a negligible advantage in the above game with restriction that the
adversary can not query predicates such that fσ (x0) = fσ (x1) = 1.
2.3 Bilinear Groups
2.3.1 Bilinear Groups of Composite Order
The composite order bilinear groups were first introduced in [10]. Let n= pqr where p,q, and r are distinct
prime numbers. LetG andGT be two multiplicative cyclic groups of composite order n and g be a generator
of G. The bilinear map e :G×G→GT has the following properties:
1. Bilinearity: ∀u,v ∈G and ∀a,b ∈ Zn, e(u
a,vb) = e(u,v)ab.
2. Non-degeneracy: ∃g such that e(g,g) 6= 1, that is, e(g,g) is a generator of GT .
We say that G is a bilinear group if the group operations in G and GT as well as the bilinear map e are all
efficiently computable. Furthermore, we assume that the description of G and GT includes generators of G
and GT respectively.
We use the notation Gp,Gq,Gr to denote the subgroups of order p,q,r of G respectively. Similarly, we
use the notation GT,p,GT,q,GT,r to denote the subgroups of order p,q,r of GT respectively.
2.3.2 Bilinear Groups of Prime Order
Let G and GT be multiplicative cyclic groups of prime p order. Let g be a generator of G. The bilinear map
e :G×G→GT has the following properties:
1. Bilinearity: ∀u,v ∈G and ∀a,b ∈ Zp, e(u
a,vb) = e(u,v)ab.
2. Non-degeneracy: ∃g such that e(g,g) has order p, that is, e(g,g) is a generator of GT .
We say that (p,G,GT ,e) are bilinear groups if the group operations in G and GT as well as the bilinear map
e are all efficiently computable.
2.3.3 Asymmetric Bilinear Groups of Prime Order
Let G,Gˆ, and GT be multiplicative cyclic groups of prime p order where G 6= Gˆ. Let g, gˆ be generators of
G,Gˆ, respectively. The asymmetric bilinear map e :G× Gˆ→GT has the following properties:
1. Bilinearity: ∀u ∈G,∀v ∈ Gˆ and ∀a,b ∈ Zp, e(u
a, vˆb) = e(u, vˆ)ab.
2. Non-degeneracy: ∃g, gˆ such that e(g, gˆ) 6= 1, that is, e(g, gˆ) is a generator of GT .
We say that G,Gˆ,GT are asymmetric bilinear groups with no efficiently computable isomorphisms if the
group operations in G,Gˆ and GT as well as the bilinear map e are all efficiently computable, but there are
no efficiently computable isomorphisms between G and Gˆ.
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2.4 Complexity Assumptions
2.4.1 Assumptions in Composite Order Bilinear Groups
We introduce three assumptions under composite order bilinear groups. The decisional composite bilinear
Diffie-Hellman (cBDH) assumption was used to construct an HVE scheme in [13]. It is a natural extension
of the decisional BDH assumption in [8] from prime order bilinear groups to composite order bilinear
groups. The bilinear subgroup decision (BSD) assumption was introduced in [11] to construct a traitor
tracing scheme. The decisional composite 3-party Diffie-Hellman (C3DH) assumption was used to construct
an HVE scheme in [13].
Decisional composite Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (cBDH) Assumption Let (n,G,GT ,e) be a description of
the bilinear group of composite order n= pqr. Let gp,gq,gr be generators of subgroups of order p,q,r of G
respectively. The decisional cBDH problem is stated as follows: given a challenge tuple
D= ((p,q,r,G,GT ,e), gp,gq,gr,g
a
p,g
b
p,g
c
p) and T,
decides whether T = e(gp,gp)
abc or T = R with random choices of a,b,c ∈ Zp, R ∈GT,p. The advantage of
A in solving the decisional cBDH problem is defined as
AdvcBDHA =
∣∣∣Pr[A(D,T = e(gp,gp)abc) = 1]−Pr[A(D,T = R) = 1]∣∣∣
where the probability is taken over the random choices of D,T and the random bits used by A.
Definition 2.4.1. We say that the decisional cBDH assumption holds if no probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithm has a non-negligible advantage in solving the decisional cBDH problem.
Bilinear Subgroup Decision (BSD) Assumption Let (n,G,GT ,e) be a description of the bilinear group of
composite order n = pqr. Let gp,gq,gr be generators of subgroups of order p,q,r of G respectively. The
BSD problem is stated as follows: given a challenge tuple
D= ((n,G,GT ,e), gp,gq,gr) and T,
decides whether T =Q ∈GT,p or T = R ∈GT with random choices of Q ∈GT,p,R ∈GT . The advantage of
A in solving the BSD problem is defined as
AdvBSDA =
∣∣∣Pr[A(D,T = Q) = 1]−Pr[A(D,T = R) = 1]∣∣∣
where the probability is taken over the random choices of D,T and the random bits used by A.
Definition 2.4.2. We say that the BSD assumption holds if no probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm has
a non-negligible advantage in solving the BSD problem.
Decisional Composite 3-party Diffie-Hellman (C3DH) Assumption Let (n,G,GT ,e) be a description of
the bilinear group of composite order n= pqr. Let gp,gq,gr be generators of subgroups of order p,q,r of G
respectively. The decisional C3DH problem is stated as follows: given a challenge tuple
D= ((n,G,GT ,e), gp,gq,gr,g
a
p,g
b
p,g
ab
p R1,g
abc
p R2) and T,
decides whether T = gcpR3 or T = R with random choices of R1,R2,R3 ∈Gq,R ∈Gpq. The advantage of A
in solving the decisional C3DH problem is defined as
AdvC3DHA =
∣∣∣Pr[A(D,T = gcpR3) = 1]−Pr[A(D,T = R) = 1]∣∣∣
where the probability is taken over the random choices for D,T and the random bits used by A.
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Definition 2.4.3. We say that the decisional C3DH assumption holds if no probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithm has a non-negligible advantage in solving the decisional C3DH problem.
2.4.2 Assumptions in Prime Order Bilinear Groups
We introduce two assumptions under prime order bilinear groups. The decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman
(BDH) assumption is well-known one and introduced in [8]. The decisional Parallel 3-party Diffie-Hellman
(P3DH) assumption is newly introduced in this paper, and its security in generic group model is given in
chapter 8.
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) Assumption Let (p,G,GT ,e) be a description of the bilinear group of
prime order p. The decisional BDH problem is stated as follows: given a challenge tuple
D=
(
(p,G,GT ,e), g,g
a,gb,gc
)
and T,
decides whether T = T0 = e(g,g)
abc or T = T1 = e(g,g)
d with random choices of a,b,c,d ∈ Zp. The
advantage of A in solving the decisional BDH problem is defined as
AdvBDHA =
∣∣∣Pr[A(D,T0) = 1]−Pr[A(D,T1) = 1]∣∣∣
where the probability is taken over the random choices of D,T and the random bits used by A. We say that
the decisional BDH assumption holds if no probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm has a non-negligible
advantage in solving the decisional BDH problem.
Parallel 3-party Diffie-Hellman (P3DH) Assumption Let (p,G,GT ,e) be a description of the bilinear
group of prime order p. The decisional P3DH problem is stated as follows: given a challenge tuple
D=
(
(p,G,GT ,e), (g, f ),(g
a, f a),(gb, f b),(gab f z1 ,gz1),(gabc f z2 ,gz2)
)
and T,
decides whether T = T0 = (g
c f z3 ,gz3) or T = T1 = (g
d f z3 ,gz3) with random choices of a,b,c,d ∈ Zp and
z1,z2,z3 ∈ Zp. The advantage of A in solving the decisional P3DH problem is defined as
AdvP3DHA =
∣∣∣Pr[A(D,T0) = 1]−Pr[A(D,T1) = 1]∣∣∣
where the probability is taken over the random choices of D,T0,T1 and the random bits used by A. We
say that the decisional P3DH assumption holds if no probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm has a non-
negligible advantage in solving the decisional P3DH problem.
Remark 1. The decisional P3DH problem can be modified as follows: an adversary is given a challenge
tuple D =
(
(p,G,GT ,e), (g, f ),(g
a, f a),(gb, f b),(gab f z1 ,gz1),(gc f z2 ,gz2)
)
and T , it decides whether T =
T0 = (g
abc f z3 ,gz3) or T = T1 = (g
d f z3 ,gz3). However, this modified one is the same as the original one by
changing the position of the challenge tuple as D =
(
(p,G,GT ,e), (g, f ),(g
a, f a),(gb, f b),(gab f z1 ,gz1),T
)
and T ′ = (gc f z2 ,gz2), Thus, we will use any one of challenge tuple forms for the decisional P3DH assump-
tion.
2.4.3 Assumptions in Asymmetric Bilinear Groups
We introduce three cryptographic assumptions that are secure under asymmetric bilinear groups of prime
order where there are no efficiently computable isomorphisms between two groups G and Gˆ. The decisional
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asymmetric bilinear Diffie-Hellman (aBDH) assumption is the same as the decisional cBDH assumption ex-
cept that it uses asymmetric bilinear groups. The decisional asymmetric Diffie-Hellman (aDH) assumption
says that the traditional decisional DH assumption holds Gˆ groups since there are no efficiently computable
isomorphisms between two groups. The decisional asymmetric 3-party Diffie-Hellman (a3DH) assumption
is an asymmetric version of the decisional C3DH assumption.
Decisional asymmetric Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (aBDH) Assumption Let (p,G,Gˆ,GT ,e) be a description
of the asymmetric bilinear group of prime order p with no efficiently computable isomorphism from G to
Gˆ. The decisional aBDH problem is stated as follows: given a challenge tuple
D= ((p,G,Gˆ,GT ,e), g,g
a,gb,gc, gˆ, gˆa, gˆb) and T,
decides whether T = e(g, gˆ)abc or T = R with random choices of a,b,c ∈ Zp, R ∈GT . The advantage of A
in solving the decisional aBDH problem is defined as
AdvaBDHA =
∣∣∣Pr[A(D,T = e(g, gˆ)abc) = 1]−Pr[A(D,T = R) = 1]∣∣∣
where the probability is taken over the random choices of D,T and the random bits used by A.
Definition 2.4.4. We say that the decisional aBDH assumption holds if no probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithm has a non-negligible advantage in solving the decisional aBDH problem.
Decisional asymmetric Diffie-Hellman (aDH) Assumption Let (p,G,Gˆ,GT ,e) be a description of the
asymmetric bilinear group of prime order p with no efficiently computable isomorphisms between G and
Gˆ. Let g, gˆ be generators of G,Gˆ respectively. The decisional aDH problem is stated as follows: given a
challenge tuple
D= ((p,G,Gˆ,GT ,e), g, gˆ, gˆ
a, gˆb) and T,
decides whether T = gˆab or T = R with random choices of a,b ∈ Zp, R ∈ Gˆ. The advantage of A in solving
the decisional aDH problem is defined as
AdvaDHA =
∣∣∣Pr[A(D,T = gˆab) = 1]−Pr[A(D,T = R) = 1]∣∣∣
where the probability is taken over the random choices of D,T and the random bits used by A.
Definition 2.4.5. We say that the decisional aDH assumption holds if no probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithm has a non-negligible advantage in solving the decisional aDH problem.
Decisional asymmetric 3-party Diffie-Hellman (a3DH) Assumption Let (p,G,Gˆ,GT ,e) be a description
of the asymmetric bilinear group of prime order p with no efficiently computable isomorphism from G to
Gˆ. Let g, gˆ be generators of G,Gˆ respectively. The decisional a3DH is stated as follows: given a challenge
tuple
D= ((p,G,Gˆ,GT ,e), g,g
a,gb,gab,gabc, gˆ, gˆa, gˆb) and T,
decides whether T = gc or T = R with random choice of a,b,c ∈ Zp, R ∈G. The advantage of A in solving
the decisional a3DH problem is defined as
Adva3DHA =
∣∣∣Pr[A(D,T = gc) = 1]−Pr[A(D,T = R) = 1]∣∣∣
where the probability is taken over the random choices for D,T and the random bits used by A.
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Definition 2.4.6. We say that the decisional a3DH assumption holds if no probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithm has a non-negligible advantage in solving the decisional a3DH problem.
Remark 2. The decisional aDH assumption is equivalent to the external Diffie-Hellman (XDH) assumption.
In this paper, we will use aDH instead of XDH for notational consistency.
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Chapter 3
Previous Work
In this chapter, we review the previous work of HVE. After the first construction of HVE by Boneh and
Waters, various HVE schemes were proposed in [13, 15, 26, 36]. The design techniques of previous HVE
schemes are classified as the following three categories.
3.1 Trivial Construction
The first category is a trivial construction from public key encryption (PKE) [7,13,23,25]. This method was
introduced by Boneh et al. to construct a public key encryption scheme with keyword search (PEKS) using
trapdoor permutations [7]. After that, Boneh and Waters showed that a searchable public key encryption
for general predicates can be constructed by this method [13]. Recently, Katz and Yerukhimovich showed
that it is possible to construct predicate encryption scheme from a CPA-secure PKE scheme if the number
of predicate such that f (x) = 0 is less than a polynomial value of a security parameter [25]. The main idea
of this method is to use a multiple instances of key-private PKE that was introduced by Bellare et al. [2].
The public key of searchable public key encryption consists of the public keys of key-private PKE, and each
instance of public keys is mapped to each predicate. However, this method has a serious problem such that
the total number of predicates is limited to the polynomial value of a security parameter.
3.1.1 PE of Boneh and Waters
Let Σ be a finite set of binary strings. A predicate f over Σ is a function f : Σ→{0,1}. We say that x∈ Σ sat-
isfies the predicate if f (x) = 1. Let Φ be the set of predicates, that is, Φ = { f1, f2, . . . , fm}. The trivial predi-
cate encryption for any set of predicates Φ using public key encryption E = (SetupE ,EncryptE ,DecryptE)
is described as follows.
Setup(1λ ): The setup algorithm first run SetupE m times to obtain (PK1,SK1), . . . ,(PKm,SKm). Then it
keeps (SK1, . . . ,SKm) as a private key and publishes a public key as PK = (PK1, . . . ,PKm).
GenToken( j,SK,PK): The token generation algorithm takes as input an index j of P in Φ and the secret
key SK. It outputs a token as TK j = ( j,SK j)
Encrypt(x,M,PK): The encrypt algorithm takes as input a string x ∈ Σ, a message M and the public key
PK. For i= 1, . . . ,m, it sets C j ← EncryptE(PK j,M) if f j(x) = 1, or it sets C j ← EncryptE(PK j,⊥)
otherwise. It outputs a ciphertext as CT = (C1, . . . ,Cm).
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Query(CT,TKσ ,PK): The query algorithm takes as input CT= (C1, . . . ,Cm) and TK j = ( j,SK j). It outputs
DecryptE(SK j,C j).
Theorem 3.1.1. The predicate encryption scheme of Boneh and Waters is secure if E is a semantically
secure public key encryption and again chosen plaintext attacks.
3.2 Extreme Generalization of AIBE
The second category is the extreme generalization of anonymous identity-based encryption (AIBE) [13, 15,
26, 36]. This method was introduced by Boneh and Waters to construct an HVE scheme [13]. They used
the identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme of Boneh and Boyen [5] and composite order bilinear groups
to provide the anonymity of ciphertexts. After that, Shi and Waters constructed a delegatable HVE (dHVE)
scheme [36]. In composite order bilinear groups, the random blinding property using subgroups provides the
anonymity of ciphertexts and the orthogonal property among subgroups provides the successful decryption.
However, it is inefficient to use composite order bilinear groups since the group order of composite order
bilinear groups should be larger than 1024 bits to defeat the integer factorization attacks. One way to
overcome this problem of inefficiency is to use prime order bilinear groups. Freeman presented a general
framework that converts cryptographic schemes from composite order bilinear groups to prime order bilinear
groups [16]. Ducas also showed that HVE schemes of composite order bilinear groups are easily converted
to prime order bilinear groups [15]. However, these conversion methods have a problem such that they work
under asymmetric bilinear groups that are particular kinds of prime order bilinear groups [17].
3.2.1 HVE of Boneh and Waters
Let Σ = Zm for some integer m and set Σ∗ = Zm∪{∗}. The HVE scheme of Boneh and Waters is described
as follows.
Setup(1λ ): The setup algorithm first generates the bilinear group G of composite order n = pq where p
and q are random primes of bit size Θ(λ ) and p,q > m. Next, it chooses random elements v ∈
Gp, (u1,h1,w1), . . . ,(ul ,hl,wl) ∈ G
2
p, and a random exponent α ∈ Zp. It keeps these as a secret key
SK. Then it chooses random elements Rv ∈ Gq and (Ru,1,Rh,1,Rw,1), . . . ,(Ru,l,Rh,l ,Rw,l) ∈G
2
q, and it
publishes a public key PK with the description of the bilinear group G as follows
PK =
(
V = vRv,
{
(Ui = uiRu,i, Hi = hiRh,i, Wi = wiRw,i)
}l
i=1
, gq, Ω = e(v,g)
α
)
.
GenToken(σ ,SK,PK): The token generation algorithm takes as input a vector σ = (σ1, . . . ,σl) ∈ Σ
l
∗ and
the secret key SK. It first selects random exponents {ri,1,ri,2}
l
i=1 ∈ Zp. Let S be the set of indexes that
are not wild card positions in the vector σ . Then it outputs a token as
TKσ =
(
K0 = g
α(∏
i∈S
u
σi
i hi)
ri,1w
ri,2
i ,
{
Ki,1 = v
ri,1 , Ki,2 = v
ri,2
}
i∈S
)
.
Encrypt(x,M,PK): The encrypt algorithm takes as input a vector x = (x1, . . . ,xl) ∈ Σ
l , a message M ∈
M ⊆ GT and the public key PK. It first chooses a random exponent t ∈ Zn and random elements
Z0,(Z1,1,Z1,2), . . . ,(Zl,1,Zl,2) ∈ Gq by raising gq to random elements from Zn. Next, it outputs a
ciphertext as
CT =
(
C = ΩtM, C0 =V
tZ0,
{
Ci,1 = (U
xi
i Hi)
tZi,1, Ci,2 =W
t
i Zi,2
}l
i=1
)
.
16
Query(CT,TKσ ,PK): The query algorithm takes as input a ciphertext CT and a token TKσ of a vector σ .
It first computes
M←C · e(C0,K0)
−1 ·∏
i∈S
e(Ci,1,Ki,1)e(Ci,2,Ki,2).
If M /∈ M, it outputs ⊥ indicating that the predicate fσ is not satisfied. Otherwise, it outputs M
indicating that the predicate fσ is satisfied.
Theorem 3.2.1 ( [13]). The HVE scheme of Boneh and Waters is selectively secure under the decisional
cBDH assumption, the BSD assumption, and the decisional C3DH assumption.
3.2.2 dHVE of Shi and Waters
Let Σ = Zm for some integer m and set Σ∗ = Zm∪{∗}. The dHVE scheme of Shi and Waters is described as
follows.
Setup(1λ ): The setup algorithm first generates the bilinear group G of composite order n = pqr where
p,q and r are random primes of bit size Θ(λ ) and p,q,r > m. Next, it chooses random elements
v,w1,w2 ∈Gp, {ui,hi} ∈G
2
p, and a random exponent α ∈ Zp. It keeps these as a secret key SK. Then
it chooses random elements Rv,Rw,1,Rw,2,{Ru,i,Rh,i} ∈ Gr, and it publishes a public key PK with the
description of the bilinear group G as follows
PK =
(
V = vRv, W1 = w1Rw,1, W2 = w2Rw,2, {(Ui = uiRu,i, Hi = hiRh,i)}
l
i=1, gq, gr, Ω = e(v,g)
α
)
.
GenToken(σ ,SK,PK): The token generation algorithm takes as input a vector σ = (σ1, . . . ,σl) ∈ Σ
l
∗
and the secret key SK. It first selects random exponents r1,r2,{r3,i} ∈ Zp and random elements
Y0,Y1,Y2,{Y3,i} ∈Gr by raising gr to random exponents in Zn. Let S be the set of indexes that are not
wild card positions in the vector σ . Then it outputs a token as
K0 = g
αw
r1
1 w
r2
2 ∏
i∈S
(uσii hi)
r3,iY0, K1 = v
r1Y1, K2 = v
r2Y2, {K3 = v
r3,iY3,i}i∈S.
Let S? be the set of indexes that are delegatable fields. It selects random exponents {si, j} ∈ Zp and
random values {Y0,i,u,Y0,i,h,Y1, j,Y2, j,{Yi, j}} ∈Gr. Next, it computes delegation components as
∀ j ∈ S? :L0, j,u = u
s j, j
i Yj,u, L0, j,h = w1
s1, jw2
s2, j ∏
i∈S
(uσii hi)
s j,ih
s j, j
j Yj,h,
L1, j = v
s1, jY1, j, L2, j = v
s2, jY2, j,
{
L3, j,i = v
s3, j,iYj,i
}
i∈S∪{ j}
.
Finally, it outputs a token as
TKσ =
(
K0, K1, K2, {K3,i}i∈S,
{
L0, j,u, L0, j,h, L1, j, L2, j, {L3, j,i}i∈S∪{ j}
}
j∈S?
)
.
Delegate(σ ′,TKσ ,PK): The delegation algorithm takes as input an attribute vector σ
′= (σ1, . . . ,σl)∈ Σ
l
?,∗
and a token TKσ . Without loss of generality, we assume that σ
′ fixes only one delegatable field of
σ . It is clear that we can perform delegation on multiple fields if we have an algorithm to perform
delegation on one field. Suppose σ ′ fixes the k-th index of σ . If the k-th index of σ ′ is set to ∗, that is,
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a wild-card field, then it can perform delegation by simply removing the delegation components that
correspond to k-th index. Otherwise, that is, if the k-th index of σ ′ is set to some value in Σ, then it
perform delegation as follows.
Let S be the set of indexes that are not delegatable fields and wild-card fields in the vector σ ′. Note
that k ∈ S. It selects random exponents µ ∈Zn and random elements Y0,Y1,Y2,{Y3,i} ∈Gr and updates
the token as
K˜0 = K0(L
σk
0,k,uL0,k,h)
µY0, K˜1 = K1L
µ
1,kY1, K˜2 = K2L
µ
2,kY2,
K˜3,k = L
µ
3,k,kY3,k,
{
K˜3,i = K3,iL
µ
3,k,iY3,i
}
i∈S\{k}
.
Let S? be the set of indexes that are delegatable fields in the vector σ
′. It selects random exponents
{τ j} ∈ Zn and random elements {Y0, j,u,Y0, j,h,Y1, j,Y2, j,{Y3, j,i}i∈S∪{ j}} j∈S? ∈Gr and re-randomize the
delegation components of the token as
∀ j ∈ S? :L˜0, j,u = L
µ
0, j,uY0, j,u, L˜0, j,h = L
µ
0, j,h(L
σk
0,k,uL0,k,h)
τ jY0, j,h,
L˜1, j = L
µ
1, jL
τ j
1, jY1, j, L˜2, j = L
µ
2, jL
τ j
2, jY2, j,
L˜3, j, j = L
µ
3, j, jY3, j, j, L˜3, j,k = L
τ j
3, j,kY3, j,k,
{
L˜3, j,i = L
µ
3, j,iL
τ j
3, j,kY3, j,i
}
i∈S\{k}
.
Finally, it outputs a token as
TKσ ′ =
(
K˜0, K˜1, K˜2, {K˜3,i}i∈S,
{
L˜0, j,h, L˜0, j,u, L˜1, j, L˜2, j, {L˜3, j,i}i∈S∪{ j}
}
j∈S?
)
.
Encrypt(x,M,PK): The encrypt algorithm takes as input a vector x = (x1, . . . ,xl) ∈ Σ
l , a message M ∈
M ⊆ GT and the public key PK. It first chooses a random exponent t ∈ Zn and random elements
Z0,Z1,Z2,{Z3,i} ∈Gq. Next, it outputs a ciphertext as
CT =
(
C = ΩtM, C0 =V
tZ0, C1 =W
t
1Z1, C2 =W
t
2Z2, {C3,i = (U
xi
i Hi)
tZ3,i}
l
i=1
)
.
Query(CT,TKσ ,PK): The query algorithm takes as input a ciphertext CT and a token TKσ of a vector σ .
It first computes
M←C · e(C0,K0)
−1 · e(C1,K1) · e(C2,K2) ·∏
i∈S
e(C3,i,K3,i).
If M /∈ M, it outputs ⊥ indicating that the predicate fσ is not satisfied. Otherwise, it outputs M
indicating that the predicate fσ is satisfied.
Theorem 3.2.2 ( [36]). The delegatable HVE scheme of Shi and Waters is selectively secure under the
decisional cBDH assumption, the BSD assumption, and the decisional C3DH assumption.
3.3 HVE from Inner Product Encryption
The third category is to use inner-product encryption (IPE) [24,29,31]. IPE is a kind of predicate encryption
and it enable the evaluation of inner-product predicates between the vector of ciphertexts and the vector
of tokens. Katz et al. constructed the first IPE scheme under composite order bilinear groups [24]. After
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that Okamoto and Takashima constructed a hierarchical IPE scheme using dual pairing vector spaces [29].
Recently, Park proposed an IPE scheme under prime order bilinear groups and proved its security under the
well-known assumptions [31]. The main idea of converting an IPE scheme to an HVE scheme is to construct
a predicate of conjunctive equality using a predicate of inner product [24]. Though, the expressiveness of IPE
enables the evaluations of predicates like conjunctive, disjunctive, polynomials, and CNF/DNF formula, IPE
has a weakness such that the number of pairing operations is linearly dependent on the number of attributes
in the ciphertexts.
3.3.1 IPE of Katz, Sahai, and Waters
Let Σ = Zm for some integer m and set Σ∗ = Zm ∪{∗}. The IPE scheme of Katz, Sahai, and Waters is
described as follows.
Setup(1λ ): The setup algorithm first generates the bilinear group G of composite order n= pqr where p,q
and r are random primes of bit size Θ(λ ) and p,q,r > m. Let gp,gq, and gr be generators of Gp,Gq,
andGr respectively. It chooses random elements {h1,i,h2,i}
l
i=1,h∈Gp and a random exponent γ ∈Zp.
It keeps these as a secret key SK. Then it chooses random elements {R1,i,R2,i}
l
i=1,Rq ∈ Gr, and it
publishes a public key PK with the description of the bilinear group G as follows
PK =
(
g= gp, Q= gqRq, gr, {(H1,i = h1,iRh,1,i, H2,i = h2,iRh,2,i)}
l
i=1, Ω = e(g,h)
γ
)
.
GenToken(σ ,SK,PK): The token generation algorithm takes as input a vector σ = (σ1, . . . ,σl) ∈ Σ
l
∗ and
the secret key SK. It first selects random exponents {r1,i,r2,i}
l
i=1 ∈Zp, random elements R5 ∈Gr,Q6 ∈
Gq, and random exponents f1, f2 ∈ Zq. Then it outputs a token as
TKσ =
(
K0 = h
γR5Q6
l
∏
i=1
(h
−r1,i
1,i h
−r2,i
2,i ), {K1,i = g
r1,ig f1σiq , K2,i = g
r2,ig f2σiq }
l
i=1
)
.
Encrypt(x,M,PK): The encrypt algorithm takes as input a vector x = (x1, . . . ,xl) ∈ Σ
l , a message M ∈
M⊆GT and the public key PK. It first chooses a random exponent t,α ,β ∈ Zn and random elements
{R3,i,R4,i}
l
i=1 ∈Gr. Next, it outputs a ciphertext as
CT =
(
C = ΩtM, C0 = g
t , {C1,i = H
t
1,iQ
ασiR3,i, C2,i =H
t
2,iQ
βσiR4,i}
l
i=1
)
.
Query(CT,TKσ ,PK): The query algorithm takes as input a ciphertext CT and a token TKσ of a vector σ .
It first computes
M←C · e(C0,K0) ·
l
∏
i=1
(
e(C1,i,K1,i) · e(C2,i,K2,i)
)
.
If M /∈ M, it outputs ⊥ indicating that the predicate fσ is not satisfied. Otherwise, it outputs M
indicating that the predicate fσ is satisfied.
Theorem 3.3.1 ( [24]). The IPE scheme of Katz, Sahai, and Waters is selectively secure under the two static
assumptions.
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3.3.2 Conversion from IPE to HVE
The hidden vector encryption HVE = (Setup,KeyGen,Encrypt,Query) using inner product encryption
IPE = (Setup′,KeyGen′,Encrypt′,Query′) is described as follows.
Setup(1λ , l): The setup algorithm first run Setup′(1λ ,2l) and obtains (PK′,SK′). Then it keeps SK′ as a
secret key and publishes a public key as PK = PK′.
GenToken(σ ,SK,PK): The token generation algorithm takes as input a vector σ = (σ1, . . . ,σl) ∈ Σ
l
∗, the
secret key SK, and the public key PK. It first convert the vector σ to a vector σ ′ = (σ ′1, . . . ,σ
′
2l) ∈ Σ
2l
as follows:
if σi 6= ∗, then σ
′
2i−1 = 1, σ
′
2i = σi.
if σi = ∗, then σ
′
2i−1 = 0, σ
′
2i = 0.
Then it outputs a token obtained by running GenToken′(σ ′,SK′,PK′).
Encrypt(x,M,PK): The encrypt algorithm takes as input a vector x = (x1, . . . ,xl) ∈ Σ
l , a message M and
the public key PK. It first choose random values r1, . . . ,rl ∈ Σ and construct a vector x
′ = (x′1, . . . ,x
′
2l)
as follows:
x′2i−1 =−ri · xi, x
′
2i = ri.
It outputs a ciphertext by running Encrypt′(x′,M,PK′).
Query(CT,TKσ ,PK): The query algorithm outputs Query
′(CT,TKσ ,PK).
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Chapter 4
Efficient HVE with Short Tokens
4.1 Overview
In this chapter, we construct efficient HVE schemes that have short tokens and prove their selective model
security under simple assumptions. Our constructions are algebraically similar to the one of Shi and Waters,
but the cost of decrypt operation in our constructions is constant.
Previous research on HVE has mainly focused on improving the expressiveness of predicates or provid-
ing additional properties like the delegation. To apply HVE schemes to real applications, it is important to
construct an efficient HVE scheme. One can measure the efficiency of HVE in terms of the ciphertext size,
the token size, and the number of pairing operations in decryption. Let l be the number of attributes in the
ciphertext and s be the number of attributes in the token except the wild card attribute. Then the efficiency of
previous HVE schemes is compared in Table 4.1. Theoretically, the number of group elements in ciphertext
should be proportional to the number of attributes in the ciphertexts, so the minimum size of ciphertext is
l|G|+O(1). However, the token size and the number of pairing operations in decryption can be constant,
that is, independent of l. Therefore constructing an HVE scheme with the constant size of tokens and the
constant number of pairing operations is an important problem to solve.
We propose HVE schemes that have the constant size of tokens and the constant cost of pairing opera-
tions. Our first construction is based on composite order bilinear groups whose order is a product of three
primes. The ciphertext consists of l+O(1) group elements, the token consists of four group elements, and
the decryption requires four pairing computations. Our second one is based on prime order asymmetric
bilinear groups where isomorphisms between two groups are not efficiently computable.
Though our construction in composite order bilinear groups is algebraically similar to the one by Shi
and Waters in [36], we achieved the constant size of tokens and the constant cost of decryption, in contrast
to the construction of Shi and Waters. The main technique for our constructions is to use the same random
value for each attributes in the token. In contrast, the construction of Shi and Waters used different random
values for each attributes. This technique is reminiscent of the one that enables the design of HIBE with
the constant size of ciphertexts in [6]. However, it is not easy to prove the security of HVE when the
same random value is used in the token, since HVE should provide an additional security property, namely
attribute hiding, that is, the ciphertext does not reveal any information about the attributes.
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Table 4.1: Comparison between previous HVE schemes and ours
Scheme Group Order Ciphertext Size Token Size No. of Pairing
BW-HVE [13] pq 2l|G|+O(1) (2s+ 1)|G| 2s+ 1
KSW-IPE [24] pqr 4l|G|+O(1) (4l+ 1)|G| 4l+ 1
SW-dHVE [36] pqr l|G|+O(1) (s+ 3)|G| s+ 3
IP-HVE [23] p 2l|G|+O(1) (2s)|G| 2s
OT-IPE [29] p 2l|G|+O(1) (2l+ 3)|G| 2l+ 3
Ours pqr l|G|+O(1) 4|G| 4
Ours p l|G|+O(1) 4|Gˆ| 4
p,q,r = prime values, l = no. of attributes in ciphertext, s = no. of attributes in token
4.2 HVE in Composite Order Groups
In this section, we construct an HVE scheme based on composite order bilinear groups and prove security
under the decisional cBDH, BSD, and decisional C3DH assumptions. Our construction has a similar alge-
braic structure to the construction of Shi and Waters [36], but ours has the constant size of tokens and the
constant number of pairing operations.
4.2.1 Construction
Let Σ = Zm for some integer m and set Σ∗ = Zm∪{∗}. Our scheme is described as follows.
Setup(1λ ): The setup algorithm first generates the bilinear group G of composite order n = pqr where
p,q and r are random primes of bit size Θ(λ ) and p,q,r > m. Next, it chooses random elements
v,w1,w2 ∈ Gp, (u1,h1), . . . ,(ul ,hl) ∈ G
2
p, and exponents α ,β ∈ Zp. It keeps these as a secret key
SK. Then it chooses random elements Rv,Rw,1,Rw,2 ∈ Gq and (Ru,1,Rh,1), . . . ,(Ru,l ,Rh,l) ∈G
2
q, and it
publishes a public key PK with the description of the bilinear group G as follows
PK =
(
V = vRv, W1 = w1Rw,1, W2 = w2Rw,2,
{
(Ui = uiRu,i, Hi = hiRh,i)
}l
i=1
,
gq, gr, Ω = e(v,g)
αβ
)
.
GenToken(σ ,SK,PK): The token generation algorithm takes as input a vector σ = (σ1, . . . ,σl) ∈ Σ
l
∗ and
the secret key SK. It first selects random exponents r1,r2,r3 ∈ Zp and random elements Y0,Y1,Y2,Y3 ∈
Gr by raising gr to random exponents in Zn. Let S be the set of indexes that are not wild card positions
in the vector σ . Then it outputs a token as
TKσ =
(
K0 = g
αβw
r1
1 w
r2
2 (∏
i∈S
u
σi
i hi)
r3Y0, K1 = v
r1Y1, K2 = v
r2Y2, K3 = v
r3Y3
)
.
Encrypt(x,M,PK): The encrypt algorithm takes as input a vector x = (x1, . . . ,xl) ∈ Σ
l , a message M ∈
M ⊆ GT and the public key PK. It first chooses a random exponent t ∈ Zn and random elements
Z0,Z1,Z2,Z3,1, . . . ,Z3,l ∈ Gq by raising gq to random elements from Zn. Next, it outputs a ciphertext
as
CT =
(
C = ΩtM, C0 =V
tZ0, C1 =W
t
1Z1, C2 =W
t
2Z2,
{
C3,i = (U
xi
i Hi)
tZ3,i
}l
i=1
)
.
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Query(CT,TKσ ,PK): The query algorithm takes as input a ciphertext CT and a token TKσ of a vector σ .
It first computes
M←C · e(C0,K0)
−1 · e(C1,K1) · e(C2,K2) · e(∏
i∈S
C3,i,K3).
If M /∈ M, it outputs ⊥ indicating that the predicate fσ is not satisfied. Otherwise, it outputs M
indicating that the predicate fσ is satisfied.
Remark 3. In our construction, we limited the finite set Σ of attributes to be Zm. If we use a collision-
resistant hash function, then we can easily expand this space to all of {0,1}∗ when m is large enough to
contain the range of the hash function.
4.2.2 Correctness
If fσ (x) = 1, then the following simple calculation shows that Query(CT,TKσ ,PK) =M as
e(C0,K0)
−1 · e(C1,K1) · e(C2,K2) · e(∏
i∈S
C3,i,K3)
= e(vt ,gαβwr11 w
r2
2 (∏
i∈S
u
σi
i hi)
r3)−1 · e(wt1,v
r1) · e(wt2,v
r2) · e(∏
i∈S
(uxii hi)
t ,vr3)
= e(vt ,gαβ )−1 · e((∏
i∈S
u
(−σi+xi)
i )
r3 ,vt) = e(vt ,gαβ )−1.
Otherwise, that is fσ (x)= 0, then we can use Lemma 5.2 in [13] to show that the probability ofQuery(CT,TKσ ,
PK) 6=⊥ is negligible by limiting |M| to less than |GT |
1/4.
4.2.3 Security
Theorem 4.2.1. The above HVE construction is selectively secure under the decisional cBDH assumption,
the BSD assumption, and the decisional C3DH assumption.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary that distinguishes the original selective security game. Then the
adversary commits two vectors x0 = (x0,1, . . . ,x0,l) and x1 = (x1,1, . . . ,x1,l)∈ Σ
l at the beginning of the game.
Let X be the set of indexes i such that x0,i = x1,i and X be the set of indexes i such that x0,i 6= x1,i. The proof
uses a sequence of four games to argue that the adversary cannot win the original security game. Each
individual game is described as follows.
Game0. This game denotes the original selective security game that is defined in Section 2.1.
Game1. We first modify Game0 slightly into a new game Game1. Game1 is almost identical to Game0
except in the way the challenge ciphertext elements are generated. In Game1, ifM0 6=M1, then the simulator
generates the challenge ciphertext element C by multiplying a random element in GT , and it generates the
rest of the ciphertext elements as usual. If M0 =M1, then the challenge ciphertext is generated correctly.
Game2. Next, we modify Game1 into a new game Game2. Game2 is almost identical to Game1 except
in the way the tokens are generated. Let S be the set of indexes that are not wild card positions of the token
query vector σ . Then any token query by the adversary must satisfy one of the following two cases:
• Type 1 fσ (x0) = fσ (x1) = 1. In this case, S∩X = /0 and σ j = x0, j = x1, j for all index j ∈ S∩X .
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• Type 2 fσ (x0) = fσ (x1) = 0. In this case, there exists an index j ∈ S such that σ j 6= xγ , j for all
γ ∈ {0,1}.
In Game2, if the adversary requests the Type 1 token query, then the simulator chooses two exponents r1
and r2 not independently at random, but in a correlated way as r1 = pir2 for a fixed value pi . The simulator
can use this correlation to simulate this game. However, the adversary cannot distinguish this correlation
because of random blinding elements Gr in the token.
Game3. We modify Game2 into a game Game3. Game2 and Game3 are identical except in the challenge
ciphertext. In Game3, the simulator creates the ciphertext according to the following distribution as
C1 =W
t
1g
ρ
pZ1, C2 =W
t
2g
−ρpi
p Z2,
where ρ is a random value in Zp and pi is the fixed value in Zp but pi is hidden from the adversary.
Game4. We now define a new game Game4. Game4 differs from Game3 in that for all i ∈ X , the
ciphertext component Ci is replaced by a random element from Gpq. Note that in Game4, the ciphertext
gives no information about the vector xγ or the message Mγ encrypted. Therefore, the adversary can win
Game4 with probability at most 1/2.
Through the following four lemmas, we will prove that it is hard to distinguish Gamei−1 from Gamei
under the given assumptions. Thus, the proof is easily obtained by the following four lemmas. This com-
pletes our proof.
Lemma 4.2.2. If the decisional cBDH assumption and the BSD assumption hold, then no polynomial-time
adversary can distinguish between Game0 and Game1 with a non-negligible advantage.
Proof. For this lemma, we additionally define a sequence of games Game0,0,Game0,1, and Game0,2 where
Game0,0 = Game0. Game0,1 and Game0,2 are almost identical to Game0,0 except in the way the chal-
lenge ciphertext is generated. In Game0,1, ifM0 6=M1, then the simulator generates the challenge ciphertext
element C by multiplying a random element in GT,p, and it generates the rest of the ciphertext elements as
usual. If M0 =M1, then the challenge ciphertext is generated correctly. In Game0,2, if M0 6=M1, then the
simulator generates the challenge ciphertext elementC as a random elements fromGT instead ofGT,p, and it
generates the rest of the ciphertext elements as usual. IfM0 =M1, then the challenge ciphertext is generated
correctly. It is not hard to see that Game0,2 is identical to Game1.
Suppose there exists an adversary A that distinguishes between Game0,0 and Game0,1 with a non-
negligible advantage. A simulator B that solves the decisional cBDH assumption using A is given: a
challenge tuple D= ((p,q,r,G,GT ,e),gp,gq,gr,g
a
p,g
b
p,g
c
p) and T where T = e(gp,gp)
abc or T = R ∈GT,p.
Then B that interacts with A is described as follows.
Init: A gives two vectors x0 = (x0,1, . . . ,x0,l),x1 = (x1,1, . . . ,x1,l) ∈ Σ
l . B then flips a random coin γ inter-
nally.
Setup: B first chooses random elements Rv,Rw,1,Rw,2 ∈ Gq, (Ru,1,Rh,1), . . . ,(Ru,l,Rh,l) ∈ G
2
q, and ran-
dom exponents v′,w′1,w
′
2 ∈ Zn, (u
′
1,h
′
1), . . . ,(u
′
l ,h
′
l) ∈ Z
2
n. Next, it publishes the group description
(n,G,GT ,e) and a public key as
V = gv
′
pRv, W1 = g
w′1
p Rw,1, W2 = g
w′2
p Rw,2, {(Ui = (g
a
p)
u′iRu,i, Hi = g
h′i
p (g
a
p)
−u′ixγ,iRh,i)},
gq, gr, Ω = e(g
a
p,g
b
p)
v′ .
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Query 1: A adaptively requests a token for a vector σ = (σ1, . . . ,σl) ∈ Σ
l
∗ to B. Let S be the set of indexes
that are not wild card positions.
Type 1 If A requests a Type 1 query, then B simply aborts and takes a random guess. The reason for
this is by our definition such as if a Type 1 query is made then the challenge messages M0,M1
will be equal. However, in this case the games Game0 and Game1 are identical, so there can
be no difference in the adversary’s advantage.
Type 2 If A requests a Type 2 query, then there exists an index j ∈ S such that σ j 6= xγ , j. Let ∆ =
∑i∈S u
′
i(σi− xγ ,i) ∈ Zp. Note that ∆ 6= 0 except with negligible probability. If ∆ 6= 0, then B
chooses random exponents r′1,r
′
2,r
′
3 ∈Zp and random elementsY0,Y1,Y2,Y3 ∈Gr. Next, it creates
a token as
K0 =g
w′1r
′
1
p g
w′2r
′
2
p (g
b
p)
−∑i∈S h
′
i/∆ ∏
i∈S
((gap)
u′i(σi−xγ,i)g
h′i
p )
r′3Y0,
K1 =g
v′r′1
p Y1, K2 = g
v′r′2
p Y2, K3 = g
v′r′3
p (g
b
p)
−v′/∆Y3.
Note that it can compute ∆−1 since it knows p. To show that the above token is the same as the
real scheme, we define the randomness of the token as
r1 = r
′
1 mod p, r2 = r
′
2 mod p, r3 = r
′
3−b/∆ mod p.
It is obvious that r1,r2,r3 are all uniformly distributed if r
′
1,r
′
2,r
′
3 are independently chosen at
random. The following calculation shows that the above token is correctly distributed as the
token in the real scheme as
K0 =g
ab
p w
r′1
1 w
r′2
2 ∏
i∈S
(
(gap)
u′i(σi−xγ,i)g
h′i
p
)r′3−b/∆Y0
=gabp w
r′1
1 w
r′2
2 g
−ab
p (g
b
p)
−∑i∈S h
′
i/∆ ∏
i∈S
(
(gap)
u′i(σi−xγ,i)g
h′i
p
)r′3Y0.
Challenge: A gives two messages M0,M1 to B. If M0 = M1, then B aborts and takes a random guess.
Otherwise, it chooses random elements Z0,Z1,Z2,Z3,1, . . . ,Z3,l ∈Gq and outputs a challenge ciphertext
as
C = T v
′
Mγ , C0 = (g
c)v
′
Z0, C1 = (g
c)w
′
1Z1, C2 = (g
c)w
′
2Z2, ∀i :C3,i = (g
c)h
′
iZ3,i.
If T is a valid cBDH tuple, then B is playing Game0,0. Otherwise, it is playing Game0,1.
Query 2: Same as Query Phase 1.
Guess: A outputs a guess γ ′. If γ = γ ′, it outputs 0. Otherwise, it outputs 1.
Suppose there exists an adversary A that distinguishes between Game0,1 and Game0,2 with a non-
negligible advantage. A simulator B that solves the BSD assumption using A is given: a tuple D =
((n,G,GT ,e),gp,gq,gr) and T where T = Q ∈ GT,p or T = R ∈ GT . Then B that interacts with A is
described as follows.
Init: A gives two vectors x0,x1 ∈ Σ
l . B then flips a random coin γ internally.
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Setup: B sets up the public key as the real setup algorithm using gp,gq,gr from the assumption.
Query 1: B answers token queries by running the real token generation algorithm except that it chooses
random exponents from Zn instead of Zp. However, this does not affect the simulation since it will
raise the elements from Gp to the exponents.
Challenge: A gives two messages M0,M1 to B. If M0 = M1, then B encrypts the message to the vector
xγ . Otherwise, it creates the challenge ciphertext of message Mγ to xγ as normal with except that C is
multiplied by T . If T ∈GT,p, then B is playing Game0,1. Otherwise, it is playing Game0,2.
Query 2: Same as Query Phase 1.
Guess: A outputs a guess γ ′. If γ = γ ′, it outputs 0. Otherwise, it outputs 1.
This completes our proof.
Lemma 4.2.3. If the decisional C3DH assumption holds, then no polynomial-time adversary can distinguish
between Game1 and Game2 with a non-negligible advantage.
Proof. Let q1 denote the maximum number of Type 1 queries made by the adversary. We define a sequence
of games Game1,0,Game1,1, . . . ,Game1,q1 where Game1,0 = Game1. In Game1,i, for all k-th Type-1
queries such that k > i, the simulator creates the token as usual using three independent random exponents
r1,r2,r3 ∈ Zn. However, for all k-th Type-1 queries such that k ≤ i, the simulator creates token components
using the correlated random exponents such as r1 = pir2 for a fixed value pi . It is obvious that Game1,q1 is
equal with Game2.
Before proving this lemma, we introduce the decisional Composite 2-party Diffie-Hellman (C2DH)
assumption as follows: Let (n,G,GT ,e) be a description of the bilinear group of composite order n= pqr.
Let gp,gq,gr be generators of subgroups of order p,q,r of G respectively. The decisional C2DH problem is
stated as follows: given a challenge tuple D= ((n,G,GT ,e), gp,gq,gr,g
a
pR1,g
b
pR2) and T , decides whether
T = gabp R3 or T =Rwith random choices of R1,R2,R3 ∈Gq,R∈Gpq. It is easy to show that if there exists an
adversary that breaks the decisional C2DH assumption, then it can break the decisional C3DH assumption.
Suppose there exists an adversary A that distinguishes between Game1,d−1 and Game1,d with a non-
negligible advantage. A simulator B that solves the decisional C2DH assumption using A is given: a
challenge tuple D = ((n,G,GT ,e),gp,gq,gr,g
a
pY1,g
b
pY2) and T where T = g
ab
p Y3 or T = R with random
choices of Y1,Y2,Y3 ∈Gr, R ∈Gpr. Then B that interacts with A is described as follows.
Init: A gives two vectors x0,x1 ∈ Σ
l . B then flips a random coin γ internally.
Setup: B first chooses random exponents v′,w′1,w
′
2,α ,β ∈ Zn, (u
′
1,h
′
1), . . . ,(u
′
l ,h
′
l) ∈ Z
2
n, then it sets v =
gv
′
p ,w1 = g
w′1
p ,w2 = g
w′2
p ,ui = g
u′i
p ,hi = g
h′i
p . Next, it chooses random elements Rv,Rw,1,Rw,2 ∈ Gq,
(Ru,1,Rh,1), . . . ,(Ru,l ,Rh,l) ∈G
2
q, and it publishes the group description and a public key as
V = vRv, W1 = w1Rw,1, W2 = w2Rw,2, {(Ui = uiRu,i, Hi = hiRh,i)}, gq, gr, Ω = e(v,gp)
αβ .
Query 1: A adaptively requests a token for a vector σ = (σ1, . . . ,σl) ∈ Σ
l
∗ to B. Let S be the set of indexes
that are not wild card positions.
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Type 1 Let k be the index of Type 1 queries. If A requests a Type 1 query, then B chooses ran-
dom exponents r1,r2,r3 ∈ Zn and random elements Y
′
0,Y
′
1,Y
′
2,Y
′
3 ∈ Gr. Next, it creates a token
depending on the k value as
k < d : K0 = g
αβ
p (g
a
pY1)
w′1r2w
r2
2 (∏
i∈S
u
σi
i hi)
r3Y ′0, K1 = (g
a
pY1)
v′r2Y ′1, K2 = v
r2Y ′2, K3 = v
r3Y ′3,
k = d : K0 = g
αβ
p T
w′1(gbpY2)
w′2(∏
i∈S
u
σi
i hi)
r3Y ′0, K1 = T
v′Y ′1, K2 = (g
b
pY2)
v′Y ′2, K3 = v
r3Y ′3,
k > d : K0 = g
αβ
p w
r1
1 w
r2
2 (∏
i∈S
u
σi
i hi)
r3Y ′0, K1 = v
r1Y ′1, K2 = v
r2Y ′2, K3 = v
r3Y ′3.
If T is not a valid C2DH tuple, then B is playing Game1,d−1. Otherwise, it is playing Game1,d
as
K0 =g
αβ
p (g
ab
p Y3)
w′1(gbpY2)
w′2(∏
i∈S
u
σi
i hi)
r3Y ′0 = g
αβ
p w
ab
1 w
b
2(∏
i∈S
u
σi
i hi)
r3Y˜0
=gαβp w
pir2
1 w
r2
2 (∏
i∈S
u
σi
i hi)
r3Y˜0,
K1 =(g
ab
p Y3)
v′Y ′1 = v
abY˜1 = v
pir2Y˜1, K2 = (g
b
pY2)
v′Y ′2 = v
bY˜2 = v
r2Y˜2,
where pi = a and r2 = b.
Type 2 If A requests a Type 2 query, then B creates the token as the real token generation algorithm
since it knows all values that are needed.
Challenge: A gives two messages M0,M1 to B. B creates the ciphertext for Mγ and xγ as the real encrypt
algorithm by choosing a random exponent t ∈ Zn and random elements in Gq.
Query 2: Same as Query Phase 1.
Guess: A outputs a guess γ ′. If γ = γ ′, it outputs 0. Otherwise, it outputs 1.
This completes our proof.
Lemma 4.2.4. If the decisional C3DH assumption holds, then no polynomial-time adversary can distinguish
between Game2 and Game3 with a non-negligible advantage.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A that distinguishes between Game2 and Game3 with a non-
negligible advantage. A simulator B that solves the decisional C3DH assumption using A is given: a
challenge tuple D= ((n,G,GT ,e), gp,gq,gr,g
a
p,g
b
p, g
ab
p R1,g
abc
p R2) and T where T = g
c
pR3 or T = g
d
pR3 for
a random exponent d ∈ Zp. Then B that interacts with A is described as follows.
Init: A gives two vectors x0 = (x0,1, . . . ,x0,l),x1 = (x1,1, . . . ,x1,l) ∈ Σ
l . B then flips a random coin γ inter-
nally.
Setup: B first chooses random exponents w′1,w
′
2,α ,β ∈Zn, (u
′
1,h
′
1), . . . ,(u
′
l ,h
′
l)∈Z
2
n, and random elements
Rv,Rw,1,Rw,2 ∈Gq, (Ru,1,Rh,1), . . . ,(Ru,l ,Rh,l) ∈G
2
q. Next, it publishes a public key as
V = (gabp R1)Rv, W1 = (g
ab
p R1 ·gp)
w′1Rw,1, W2 = g
w′2
p Rw,2,
{(Ui = (g
b
p)
u′iRu,i, Hi = (g
b
p)
−u′ixγ,i(gabp R1)
h′iRh,i)}1≤i≤l , gq, gr, Ω = e(g
ab
p R1,gp)
αβ .
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Query 1: A adaptively requests a token for a vector σ = (σ1, . . . ,σl) ∈ Σ
l
∗ to B. Let S be the set of indexes
that are not wild card positions.
Type 1 If A requests a Type 1 query, then B chooses random exponents r′1,r
′
3 ∈ Zn and random
elements Y0,Y1,Y2,Y3 ∈Gr. Next, it creates a token as
K0 =g
αβ
p
(
gap
)w′1w′2r′1g∑i∈S h′ir′3p Y0,K1 = (gap)w′2r′1Y1, K2 = (gap)−w′1r′1Y2, K3 = gr′3p Y3.
To show that the above token is the same as the token in Game3, we define the randomness of
the token as
r1 = w
′
2r
′
1/b mod p, r2 =−w
′
1r
′
1/b mod p, r3 = r
′
3/ab mod p.
It is obvious that two random r1 and r2 are correlated as r1 = pir2 where pi = −w
′
2/w
′
1. The
distribution of the above token is correct as follows
K0 =g
αβ
p
(
g
(ab+1)w′1
p
)w′2r′1/b(gw′2p )−w′1r′1/b(g∑i∈S(bu′i(σi−xγ,i)+abh′i)p )r′3/abY0
=gαβp g
aw′1w
′
2r
′
1
p g
∑i∈S h
′
ir
′
3
p Y0.
Type 2 If A requests a Type 2 query, then there exists an index j ∈ S such that σ j 6= xγ , j. Let ∆ =
∑i∈S u
′
i(σi − xγ ,i) ∈ Zp. Note that ∆ 6= 0 except with negligible probability. B first chooses
random exponents r′1,r
′
2,r
′
3 ∈ Zn and random elements Y0,Y1,Y2,Y3 ∈ Gr, then it creates a token
as
K0 =g
αβ
p
(
gap
)w′1w′2r′1g∆w′2r′3p (gap)∑i∈S h′iw′2r′3g∑i∈S h′iw′2r′2p Y0,
K1 =
(
gap
)w′2r′1Y1, K2 = (gap)−w′1r′1(gbp)−∆r′2Y2, K3 = (gap)w′2r′3gw′2r′2p Y3.
To show that the above token is the same as the token in Game3, we define the randomness of
the token as
r1 = w
′
2r
′
1/b mod p, r2 =−w
′
1r
′
1/b−b∆r
′
2/ab mod p,
r3 = w
′
2r
′
3/b+w
′
2r
′
2/ab mod p.
It is not hard to see that r1,r2,r3 are independent random values since ∆ 6= 0 except with negli-
gible probability. The distribution of the above token is correct as follows
K0 =g
αβ
p
(
g
(ab+1)w′1
p
)w′2r′1/b(gw′2p )−w′1r′1/b−∑i∈S bu′i(σi−xγ,i)r′2/ab(g∑i∈S(bu′i(σi−xγ,i)+abh′i)p )w′2r′3/b+w′2r′2/abY0
=gαβp g
aw′1w
′
2r
′
1
p g
∆w′2r
′
3
p g
∑i∈S(ah
′
iw
′
2r
′
3+h
′
iw
′
2r
′
2)
p Y0.
Challenge: A gives two messagesM0,M1 to B. IfM0 =M1, then B computesC= e(g
abc
p R2,gp)
αβMγ . Oth-
erwise, it chooses a random elements inGT forC. Next, it chooses random elements Z0,Z1,Z2,Z3,1, . . . ,
Z3,l ∈Gq and outputs a challenge ciphertext as
C0 = (g
abc
p R2)Z0, C1 = (g
abc
p R2 ·T )
w′1Z1, C2 = T
w′2Z2, ∀i :C3,i = (g
abc
p R2)
h′iZ3,i.
If T is a valid C3DH tuple, then B is playing Game2. Otherwise, it is playing Game3 as follows
C1 =(g
abc
p R2 ·g
d
pR3)
w′1Z1 = (g
abc
p ·g
c−c
p ·g
d
p)
w′1Z1 = (g
abc
p g
c
p)
w′1 ·g
(−c+d)w′1
p Z1 =W
c
1 g
ρ
pZ
′
1,
C2 =(g
d
pR3)
w′2Z2 = g
(ρ/w′1+c)w
′
2
p Z2 = g
cw′2
p ·g
ρ ·w′2/w
′
1
p Z2 =W
c
2 g
−ρ ·pi
p Z
′
2
where T = gdpR3, ρ = (−c+d)w
′
1 and pi =−w
′
2/w
′
1.
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Query 2: Same as Query Phase 1.
Guess: A outputs a guess γ ′. If γ = γ ′, it outputs 0. Otherwise, it outputs 1.
This completes our proof.
Lemma 4.2.5. If the decisional C3DH assumption holds, then no polynomial-time adversary can distinguish
between Game3 and Game4 with a non-negligible advantage.
Proof. Let X denote the set of indexes i where two committed vectors x0,x1 are not equal. We define a
sequence of games Game3,0,Game3,1, . . . ,Game3,|X | where Game3,0 = Game3. Let X i ⊆ X denote the
set of first i indexes in X . In Game3,i, the simulator creates ciphertext elements C,C0, and C j normally for
all j /∈ X i. For all j ∈ X i, the simulator replaces C j with random elements in Gpq. For C1,C2, the simulator
creates the following ciphertext elements like in game Game4 as
C1 =W
t
1g
ρ
pZ1, C2 =W
t
2g
−ρpi
p Z2
where ρ is a random element from Zp. Note that it is not hard to see that Game3,|X | = Game4.
Suppose there exists an adversary A that distinguishes between Game3,d−1 and Game3,d with a non-
negligible advantage. A simulator B that solves the C3DH assumption using A is given: a challenge tuple
D = ((n,G,GT ,e), gp,gq,gr,g
a
p,g
b
p,g
ab
p R1,g
abc
p R2) and T where T = g
c
pR3 or T = R. Then B that interacts
with A is described as follows.
Init: A gives two vectors x0 = (x0,1, . . . ,x0,l),x1 = (x1,1, . . . ,x1,l) ∈ Σ
l . B then flips a random coin γ inter-
nally.
Setup: B first chooses random exponents w′1,w
′
2,α ,β ∈Zn, (u
′
1,h
′
1), . . . ,(u
′
l ,h
′
l)∈Z
2
n, and random elements
Rv,Rw,1,Rw,2 ∈Gq, (Ru,1,Rh,1), . . . ,(Ru,l ,Rh,l) ∈G
2
q. Next, it publishes a public key as
V = (gabp R1)Rv, W1 = (g
ab
p R1 ·gp)
w′1Rw,1, W2 = g
w′2
p Rw,2,(Ud = (g
b
p)
u′dRu,d , Hd = (g
b
p)
−u′dxγ,d (gp)
h′dRh,d),
{(Ui = (g
b
p)
u′iRu,i, Hi = (g
b
p)
−u′ixγ,i(gabp R1)
h′iRh,i)}1≤i6=d≤l , gq, gr, Ω = e(g
ab
p R1,gp)
αβ .
Query 1: A adaptively requests a token for a vector σ = (σ1, . . . ,σl) ∈ Σ
l
∗ to B. Let S be the set of indexes
that are not wild card positions.
Type 1 For Type 1 queries, it is guaranteed that d /∈ S since S∩X = /0 and d ∈ X . IfA requests a Type
1 query, then B chooses random exponents r′1,r
′
3 ∈ Zn and random elements Y0,Y1,Y2,Y3 ∈ Gr.
Next, it creates a token as
K0 = g
αβ
p
(
gap
)w′1w′2r′1g∑i∈S h′ir′3p Y0, K1 = (gap)w′2r′1Y1, K2 = (gap)−w′1r′1Y2, K3 = gr′3p Y3.
Note that it is the same as the simulation of the Type 1 token in Game3 if the randomness of the
token are defined as
r1 = w
′
2r
′
1/b mod p, r2 =−w
′
1r
′
1/b mod p, r3 = r
′
3/ab mod p.
29
Type 2 For Type 2 queries, there exists an index j ∈ S such that σ j 6= xγ , j and there exists two cases
such that d /∈ S or d ∈ S. Let ∆ = ∑i∈S u
′
i(σi− xγ ,i) ∈ Zp. Note that ∆ 6= 0 except with negligible
probability.
In case of d /∈ S, B chooses random exponents r′1,r
′
2,r
′
3 ∈ Zn and random elements Y0,Y1,Y2,Y3 ∈
Gr, then it creates a token as
K0 = g
αβ
p
(
gap
)w′1w′2r′1g∆w′2r′3p (gap)∑i∈S h′iw′2r′3g∑i∈S h′iw′2r′2p Y0,
K1 =
(
gap
)w′2r′1Y1, K2 = (gap)−w′1r′1(gbp)−∆r′2Y2, K3 = (gap)w′2r′3gw′2r′2p Y3.
Note that it is the same as the simulation of the Type 2 token in Game3 if the randomness of the
token are defined as
r1 = w
′
2r
′
1/b mod p, r2 =−w
′
1r
′
1/b−b∆r
′
2/ab mod p,
r3 = w
′
2r
′
3/b+w
′
2r
′
2/ab mod p.
In case of d ∈ S, B chooses random exponents r′1,r
′
2,r
′
3 ∈ Zn and random elements Y0,Y1,Y2,Y3 ∈
Gr, then it creates a token as
K0 = g
αβ
p
(
gap
)w′1w′2r′1g∆w′2r′3p (gap)∑i∈S\{d} h′iw′2r′3g∑i∈S\{d} h′iw′2r′2p Y0,
K1 =
(
gap
)w′2r′1Y1, K2 = (gap)−w′1r′1(gbp)−∆r′2Y2, K3 = (gap)w′2r′3gw′2r′2p Y3.
To show that the above token is the same as the token in Game3, we define the randomness of
the token as
r1 = w
′
2r
′
1/b mod p, r2 =−(w
′
1r
′
1+h
′
dr
′
3)/b− (b∆+h
′
d)r
′
2/ab mod p,
r3 = w
′
2r
′
3/b+w
′
2r
′
2/ab mod p.
It is not hard to see that r1,r2,r3 are independent random values since ∆ 6= 0 except with negli-
gible probability. Therefore, the distribution of the above token is correct as follows
K0 =g
αβ
p w
r1
1 w
r2
2 (u
σd
d hd)
r3
(
∏
i∈S\{d}
u
σi
i hi
)r3
Y0
=gαβp
(
g
(ab+1)w′1
p
)w′2r′1/b(gw′2p )−(w′1r′1+h′dr′3)/b−(b∆+h′d)r′2/ab(g(bu′d(σd−xγ,d)+h′d)p )w′2r′3/b+w′2r′2/ab(
g
∑i∈S\{d}(bu
′
i(σi−xγ,i)+abh
′
i)
p
)w′2r′3/b+w′2r′2/abY0
=gαβp g
aw′1w
′
2r
′
1
p g
∆w′2r
′
3
p g
∑i∈S\{d}(ah
′
iw
′
2r
′
3+h
′
iw
′
2r
′
2)
p Y0.
Challenge: A gives two messagesM0,M1 to B. IfM0 =M1, then B computesC= e(g
abc
p R2,gp)
αβMγ . Oth-
erwise, it chooses a random elements inGT forC. Next, it chooses random elements P,P3,1, . . . ,P3,d−1 ∈
Gp and Z0,Z1,Z2,Z3,1, . . . ,Z3,l ∈Gq, then it outputs a challenge ciphertext as
C0 = (g
abc
p R2)Z0, C1 = (g
abc
p R2 ·P)
w′1Z1, C2 = P
w′2Z2,
∀i< d :C3,i = P3,iZ3,i, C3,d = T
h′dZ3,d , ∀i> d :C3,i = (g
abc
p R2)
h′iZ3,i.
If T is a valid C3DH tuple, then B is playing Game3,d−1. Otherwise, it is playing Game3,d .
Query 2: Same as Query Phase 1.
Guess: A outputs a guess γ ′. If γ = γ ′, it outputs 0. Otherwise, it outputs 1.
This completes our proof.
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4.3 HVE in Asymmetric Bilinear Groups
In this section, we construct an HVE scheme in asymmetric bilinear groups of prime order where there are
no efficiently computable isomorphisms between two groups G and Gˆ. This construction is algebraically
similar to our construction in composite order bilinear groups. In the composite order setting, the subgroups
Gq and Gr were used to provide the anonymity of ciphertexts and to hide the correlation between two
random values respectively. However, in the prime order asymmetric setting, the non-existence of efficiently
computable isomorphisms provides the anonymity of ciphertexts and hides the correlation of two random
values in tokens.
4.3.1 Construction
Let Σ = Zm for some integer m and set Σ∗ = Zm∪{∗}. Our scheme is described as follows.
Setup(1λ ): The setup algorithm first generates the asymmetric bilinear group G,Gˆ of prime order p where
p is a random prime of bit size Θ(λ ) and p>m. Let g, gˆ be the generators of G,Gˆ respectively. Next,
it chooses random exponents v′,w′1,w
′
2 ∈ Zp, (u
′
1,h
′
1), . . . ,(u
′
l ,h
′
l) ∈ Zp, and α ,β ∈ Zp. It keeps these
as a secret key SK and outputs a public key PK with the description of the asymmetric bilinear group
G,Gˆ as follows
PK =
(
v= gv
′
,w1 = g
w′1 ,w2 = g
w′2 , {(ui = g
u′i ,hi = g
h′i)}li=1, Ω = e(v, gˆ)
αβ
)
.
GenToken(σ ,SK,PK): The token generation algorithm takes as input a vector σ = (σ1, . . . ,σl) ∈ Σ
l
∗ and
the secret key SK. It first selects random exponents r1,r2,r3 ∈ Zp and computes vˆ = gˆ
v′ , wˆ1 =
gˆw
′
1 , wˆ2 = gˆ
w′2 , uˆi = gˆ
u′i , hˆi = gˆ
h′i . Next, it outputs a token as
TKσ =
(
K0 = gˆ
αβ wˆ
r1
1 wˆ
r2
2 (∏
i∈S
uˆ
σi
i hˆi)
r3 , K1 = vˆ
r1 , K2 = vˆ
r2 , K3 = vˆ
r3
)
.
Encrypt(x,M,PK): The encrypt algorithm takes as input a vector x= (x1, . . . ,xl)∈ Σ
l , a messageM ∈M⊆
GT and the public key PK. It chooses a random exponent t ∈ Zp and outputs a ciphertext as
CT =
(
C = ΩtM, C0 = v
t , C1 = w
t
1, C2 = w
t
2, {C3,i = (u
xi
i hi)
t}li=1
)
.
Query(CT,TKσ ,PK): The query algorithm takes as input a ciphertext CT and a token TKσ with a vector
σ . It first computes
M←C · e(C0,K0)
−1 · e(C1,K1) · e(C2,K2) · e(∏
i∈S
C3,i,K3).
If M /∈ M, it outputs ⊥ indicating that the predicate fσ is not satisfied. Otherwise, it outputs M
indicating that the predicate fσ is satisfied.
Remark 4. We can expand the finite space Σ from Zm to all of {0,1}
∗ by using a collision-resistant hash
function for the vector of attributes.
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4.3.2 Security
Theorem 4.3.1. The above HVE construction is selectively secure under the decisional aBDH assumption,
the decisional aDH assumption, and the decisional a3DH assumption.
Proof. The main structure of this proof is almost the same as the proof of Theorem 4.2.1. That is, it
consists of a sequence of Game0, Game1, Game2, Game3, Game4 games, and we prove that there is no
probabilistic polynomial-time adversary that distinguishes between Gamei−1 and Gamei. These games are
nearly the same as those in the proof of Theorem 4.2.1. The difference is that the ciphertext elements and the
token elements are represented in prime order groups, whereas those elements were represented in composite
order groups in the proof of Theorem 4.2.1. For instance, C1,C2 elements of the challenge ciphertext are
replaced by C1 = w
t
1g
ρ ,C2 = w
t
2g
−ρpi in Game3, and theCi elements of the challenge ciphertext in Game4
are replaced with random values in G.
First, the indistinguishability between Game0 and Game1 can be proven using the decisional aBDH
assumption. The proof is almost the same as Lemma 4.2.2, since the main components of the decisional
aBDH assumption under prime order asymmetric bilinear groups are the same as the decisional cBDH
assumption. Note that the BSD assumption for Theorem 4.2.1 is not needed. Second, the indistinguishability
between Game1 and Game2 can be proven using the decisional aDH assumption for Gˆ under prime order
asymmetric bilinear groups. The proof is the same as Lemma 4.2.3, since the decisional C2DH assumption
in Lemma 4.2.3 is converted to the decisional aDH assumption in prime order asymmetric bilinear groups.
Finally, the indistinguishability between Game2 and Game3, (the indistinguishability between Game3 and
Game4, respectively) can be proven under the decisional a3DH assumption. The proof is the same as
Lemma 4.2.4 (Lemma 4.2.5 respectively) except using the decisional a3DH instead of the decisional C3DH
assumption, since the decisional C3DH assumption can be converted to the decisional a3DH in prime order
asymmetric bilinear groups. This completes our proof.
4.3.3 Discussion
4.3.4 Freeman Method
Recently, a heuristic methodology that converts cryptosystems from composite order bilinear groups to
prime order asymmetric bilinear groups was proposed by Freeman in [16]. The main idea of Freeman’s
method is constructing a product group Gn that has orthogonal subgroups by applying the direct product
to a prime order bilinear group G where n is the number of subgroups. Our construction in composite
order bilinear groups is also converted to a new construction in prime order asymmetric bilinear groups by
applying Freeman’s method. However, the new construction requires three group elements of the prime
order group to represent one element in the composite order group since Freeman’s method converts one
element of composite order groups with three subgroups to three elements of prime order groups. That is,
the number of groups elements in ciphertexts and tokens, and the number of pairing operations in decryption
increase by three times.
32
Chapter 5
Convert HVE from Composite to Prime
Order Groups
5.1 Overview
In this chapter, we construct HVE schemes that are secure under any kind of pairing types and prove their
selective model security. To achieve our goals, we first presents a framework that converts HVE schemes
that are the extreme generalization of AIBE from composite order bilinear groups to prime order bilinear
groups.
The previous conversion methods that convert cryptographic schemes from composite order bilinear
groups to prime order bilinear groups are Freeman’s method and Ducas’ method [15, 16]. The conversion
method of Ducas is that random blinding elements in ciphertexts can be eliminated in asymmetric bilinear
groups of prime order since the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption holds in asymmetric bilinear
groups. Using this method, Ducas converted some anonymous hierarchical IBE (AHIBE) and HVE schemes
from bilinear groups of composite order to asymmetric bilinear groups of prime order. The conversion
method of Freeman is that product groups using a direct product of groups and vector orthogonality using an
inner product operation provide the subgroup decision hardness and the subgroup orthogonality properties
in prime order bilinear groups, respectively. The merit of Freeman’s method is that it convert almost all
cryptographic schemes from bilinear groups of composite order to asymmetric bilinear groups of prime
order. The demerits of Freeman’s method are that the resulting schemes work in asymmetric bilinear groups
and use complex assumptions that depend on complex basis vectors.
The conversion method of this paper is similar to the conversion method of Freeman in terms of using
product groups and vector orthogonality, but it has the following three differences. The first difference is
that Freeman’s method is related to the subgroup decision (SGD) assumption in prime order bilinear groups,
whereas our method is not related to the SGD assumption. The second difference is that Freeman’s method
only works in asymmetric bilinear groups of prime order, whereas our method works in any bilinear groups
of prime order. The third difference is that the cryptographic schemes from Freeman’s method use complex
assumptions that depend on complex basis vectors, whereas the HVE schemes from our method use simple
assumptions that are independent of basis vectors.
We first convert the HVE scheme of Boneh and Waters, the delegatable HVE scheme of Shi and Waters,
and the efficient HVE scheme with constant cost of pairing of Lee and Lee from composite order bilinear
groups to prime order bilinear groups. Next we prove that these converted HVE schemes are selectively se-
cure under the decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) and the decisional Parallel 3-party Diffie-Hellman
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Table 5.1: Comparison between previous HVE schemes and ours
Scheme Group Order Pairing Type Ciphertext Size No. of Pairing
BW-HVE [13] p1p2 Type 1 (2l+ 1)|G|+ |GT | 2s+ 1
KSW-IPE [24] p1p2p3 Type 1 (4l+ 1)|G|+ |GT | 4l+ 1
SW-dHVE [36] p1p2p3 Type 1 (l+ 3)|G|+ |GT | s+ 3
OT-IPE [29] p Type 1,2,3 (2l+ 3)|G|+ |GT | 2l+ 3
Duc-dHVE [15] p Type 3 (l+ 3)|G1|+ |GT | s+ 3
Par-IPE [31] p Type 1,2,3 (8l+ 2)|G|+ |GT | 8s+ 2
LL-HVE [26] p1p2p3 Type 1 (l+ 3)|G|+ |GT | 4
LL-HVE [26] p Type 3 (l+ 3)|G1|+ |GT | 4
Ours (BW-HVE) p Type 1,2,3 (4l+ 2)|G|+ |GT | 4s+ 2
Ours (SW-dHVE) p Type 1,2,3 (3l+ 9)|G|+ |GT | 3s+ 9
Ours (LL-HVE) p Type 1,2,3 (3l+ 9)|G|+ |GT | 12
p = prime value, l = no. of attributes in ciphertext, s = no. of attributes in token
(P3DH) assumptions. Through these conversion, we constructed the first delegatable HVE scheme and
efficient HVE scheme with constant cost of pairing in any bilinear groups of prime order. The previous
HVE schemes and ours are compared in Table 5.1. In Table 5.1, HVE schemes from IPE schemes are also
included since IPE imply HVE. Finally, we prove that the new decisional P3DH assumption is secure in
generic group model that was introduced by Shoup in [37].
5.2 Framework
The basic idea to convert HVE schemes from composite order bilinear groups to prime order bilinear groups
is to use bilinear product groups that are extended from bilinear groups using the direct product opera-
tion. Bilinear product groups were widely used in dual system encryption of Waters [28, 40], private linear
broadcast encryption of Garg et al. [18], and the conversion method of Freeman [16]. The product groups
extended from multiplicative cyclic groups represent an exponent as a vector. Thus vector operations in
product groups should be defined. Since bilinear groups have bilinear maps, the bilinear maps on bilin-
ear product groups should be defined. Definition 5.2.1 and Definition 5.2.2 define the vector operations in
product groups and bilinear product groups, respectively.
Definition 5.2.1 (Vector Operations). Let G be multiplicative cyclic groups of prime p order. Let g be a
generator of G. We define vector operations over G as follows:
1. For a vector b= (b1, . . . ,bn) ∈ Z
n
p, define g
b := (gb1 , . . . ,gbn) ∈Gn.
2. For a vector b= (b1, . . . ,bn) ∈ Z
n
p and a scalar c ∈ Zp, define (g
b)c := (gb1c, . . . ,gbnc) ∈Gn.
3. For two vectors a= (a1, . . . ,an),b= (b1, . . . ,bn) ∈ Z
n
p, define g
agb := (ga1+b1 , . . . ,gan+bn) ∈Gn.
Definition 5.2.2 (Bilinear Product Groups). Let (p,G,GT , eˆ) be bilinear groups of prime order. Let g be a
generator ofG. For integers n and m, the bilinear product groups ((p,G,GT ,e),g
b1 , . . . ,gbm) of basis vectors
b1, . . . ,bm is defined as follows
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1. The basis vectors b1, . . . ,bm are random vectors such that bi = (bi,1, . . . ,bi,n) ∈ Z
n
p.
2. The bilinear map e : Gn×Gn → GT is defined as e(g
a,gb) := ∏ni=1 eˆ(g
ai ,gbi) = eˆ(g,g)a·b where · is
the inner product operation.
To guarantee the correctness of cryptographic schemes in bilinear product groups, the orthogonal prop-
erty of composite order bilinear groups should be implemented in bilinear product groups. The previous
researches [16, 18, 28, 40] showed that the orthogonal property can be implemented in bilinear product
groups. The idea is that the orthogonality between vectors can be defined using the inner-product operation
such that x · y = 0 since the bilinear map provides the inner-product operation. Definition 5.2.3 define the
orthogonality in bilinear product groups.
Definition 5.2.3 (Orthogonality). Let ((p,G,GT ,e),g
b1 , . . . ,gbm) be bilinear product groups with n,m pa-
rameters. Let Gi,G j be subgroups spanned by g
bi ,gb j , respectively. That is, Gi = 〈g
bi〉 and G j = 〈g
b j 〉.
Then the two subgroups Gi and G j are orthogonal to each other if e(A,B) = 1 for all A ∈ Gi and B ∈ G j.
The main idea of our method that convert HVE schemes from composite order bilinear groups to prime
order bilinear groups is that the previous HVE schemes [13, 26, 36] in composite order bilinear groups use
the decisional Composite 3-party Diffie-Hellman (C3DH) assumption that is not a kind of the subgroup
decision (SGD) assumption.
The SGD assumption is to distinguish whether h∈G or h∈G1 whereG is a group andG1 is a subgroup
of G [10]. In product groups Gn, a subgroup G is defined as a vector space spanned by some basis vectors
b1, . . . ,bm such that G = 〈g
b1 , . . . ,gbm〉. If a subgroup is constructed from one basis vector, then the SGD
assumption is related to the DDH assumption. If a subgroup is constructed from k number of basis vectors,
then the SGD assumption is related to the decisional k-Linear (k-DLIN) assumption [16]. In symmetric
bilinear groups of prime order, a subgroup should be constructed from two basis vectors since the DDH
assumption is not valid [18, 40]. If a subgroup is constructed from two basis vectors, then cryptographic
schemes become complicated and there is no generic conversion method from composite order groups to
prime order groups. In asymmetric bilinear groups of prime order, a subgroup can be constructed from one
basis vector since the DDH assumption is valid [16, 28]. If a subgroup is constructed from one basis vector,
then there is a generic conversion method of Freeman, but it only works in asymmetric bilinear groups.
The decisional C3DH assumption is defined in Definition 5.2.4. The notable properties of the decisional
C3DH assumption are that the T value is always an element of Gp1p2 in contrast to the SGD assumption,
and the subgroup Gp2 plays the role of random blinding. From these properties of the C3DH assumption,
it is possible to use just one basis vector to construct a subgroup. Additionally, it is possible to use simple
basis vectors for cryptographic schemes since ciphertexts and tokens can use different subgroups that are
not orthogonal.
Definition 5.2.4 (Composite 3-party Diffie-Hellman (C3DH) Assumption). Let (n,G,GT ,e) be a descrip-
tion of bilinear groups of composite order n = p1 · · · pm where pi is a random prime. Let gpi be a gen-
erator of the subgroup Gpi . The decisional C3DH assumption is stated as follows: given a challenge
tuple D =
(
(n,G,GT ,e),gp1 , . . . ,gpm ,g
a
p1
,gbp1 ,g
ab
p1
R1,g
abc
p1
R2
)
and T , decides whether T = T0 = g
c
p1
R3 or
T = T1 = g
d
p1
R3 with random choices of a,b,c,d ∈ Zp1 and R1,R2,R3 ∈Gp2 .
For instance, we selects basis vectors b1,1 = (1,0),b1,2 = (1,a),b2 = (a,−1) for the conversion from bi-
linear groups of composite n= p1p2 order. For the conversion from bilinear groups of composite n= p1p2p3
order, we selects basis vectors b1,1 = (1,0,a1),b1,2 = (1,a2,0),b2 = (a2,−1,a1a2−a3),b3 = (a1,a3,−1).
Though different basis vectors for the structure of composite order were selected, the assumption for the
security proof is the simple one that is independent of basis vectors.
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5.3 Conversion 1: BW-HVE
In this section, we convert the HVE scheme of Boneh and Waters [13] to prime order bilinear groups and
prove its selective model security under the decisional BDH and P3DH assumptions.
5.3.1 Construction
Setup(1λ , l): The setup algorithm first generates the bilinear group G of prime order p of bit size Θ(λ ). It
chooses a random value a∈Zp and sets basis vectors for bilinear product groups as b1,1=(1,0), b1,2=
(1,a), b2 = (a,−1). Next, it chooses random exponents v
′,{u′i,h
′
i,w
′
i}
l
i=1,α ∈ Zp, and it computes
the following values using the basis vectors
B1,1 = g
b1,1 , B1,2 = g
b1,2 , B2 = g
b2 ,
gv1 = Bv
′
1,1,
{
gu1,i = B
u′i
1,1, g
h1,i = B
h′i
1,1, g
w1,i = B
w′i
1,1
}l
i=1
,
gv2 = Bv
′
1,2,
{
gu2,i = B
u′i
1,2, g
h2,i = B
h′i
1,2, g
w2,i = B
w′i
1,2
}l
i=1
.
It keeps gv2 ,{gu2,i ,gh2,i ,gw2,i}li=1,(g
b1,2)α as a secret key SK. Then it publishes a public key PK using
random blinding values zv,{zu,i,zh,i,zw,i}
l
i=1 ∈ Zp as follows
PK =
(
B1,1, B1,2, B2, V= g
v1B
zv
2 ,
{
Ui = g
u1,iB
zu,i
2 , Hi = g
h1,iB
zh,i
2 , Wi = g
w1,iB
zw,i
2
}l
i=1
,
Ω = e(gv1 ,gb1,2)α
)
.
GenToken(σ ,SK,PK): The token generation algorithm takes as input an attribute vector σ =(σ1, . . . ,σl)∈
Σl∗ and the secret key SK. Let S be the set of indexes that are not wild-card fields in the vector ~σ . It
selects random exponents {r1,i,r2,i}i∈S ∈ Zp and outputs a token as
TK~σ =
(
K1 = (g
b1,2)α ∏
i∈S
((gu2,i)σigh2,i)r1,i(gw2,i)r2,i ,
{
K2,i = (g
v2)−r1,i , K3,i = (g
v2)−r2,i
}
i∈S
)
.
Encrypt(x,M,PK): The encryption algorithm takes as input an attribute vector x= (x1, . . . ,xl) ∈ Σ
l, a mes-
sage M ∈M⊆ GT , and the public key PK. It first chooses a random exponent t ∈ Zp and random
blinding values z1,{z2,i,z3,i}
l
i=1 ∈ Zp. Then it outputs a ciphertext as
CT =
(
C0 = Ω
tM, C1 = V
tB
z1
2 ,
{
C2,i = (U
xi
i Hi)
tB
z2,i
2 , C3,i =W
t
iB
z3,i
2
}l
i=1
)
.
Query(CT,TKσ ,PK): The query algorithm takes as input a ciphertext CT and a token TKσ of a vector σ .
It first computes
M←C0 ·
(
e(C1,K1) ·∏
i∈S
(
e(C2,i,K2,i) · e(C3,i,K3,i)
))−1
.
If M /∈ M, it outputs ⊥ indicating that the predicate f~σ is not satisfied. Otherwise, it outputs M
indicating that the predicate f~σ is satisfied.
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5.3.2 Correctness
If fσ (x) = 1, then the following calculations shows that Query(CT,TKσ ,PK) =M using the orthogonality
of basis vectors such that e(gb2 ,gb1,2) = 1.
e(C1,K1) ·∏
i∈S
(
e(C2,i,K2,i) · e(C3,i,K3,i)
)
= e((gv1)t ,(gb1,2)α ∏
i∈S
((gu2,i)σigh2,i)r1,i(gw2,i)r2,i) ·∏
i∈S
(
e(((gu1,i)xigh1,i)t ,(gv2)−r1,i) · e((gwi)t ,(gv2)−r2,i)
)
= e((gv1)t ,(gb1,2)α) ·∏
i∈S
e(gv
′
,(gu
′
i)(σi−xi))t·r1,i = e(gv1 ,gb1,2)αt .
Otherwise, that is fσ (x) = 0, then the probability of Query(CT,TKσ ,PK) 6=⊥ is negligible by limiting |M|
to less than |GT |
1/4.
5.3.3 Security
Theorem 5.3.1. The above HVE construction is selectively secure under the decisional BDH and P3DH
assumptions.
The proof of this theorem is easily obtained from the following four Lemma 5.3.2, 5.3.3, 5.3.4, and 5.3.5.
Before presenting the four lemmas, we first introduce the following three assumptions. The HVE scheme of
Boneh and Waters constructed in bilinear groups of composite n = p1p2 order, and its security was proven
under the decisional BDH, Bilinear Subgroup Decision (BSD), and the decisional C3DH assumptions [13].
These assumptions in composite order bilinear groups are converted to the following Assumptions 5.3-1,
5.3-2, and 5.3-3 using our conversion method.
Assumption 5.3-1 Let ((p,G,GT ,e),g
b1,1 ,gb1,2 ,gb2) be the bilinear product group of basis vectors b1,1 =
(1,0),b1,2 = (1,a), and b2 = (a,−1). The Assumption 5.3-1 is stated as follows: given a challenge tuple
D=
(
(p,G,GT ,e), g
b1,1 ,gb1,2 ,gb2 ,(gb1,1)c1 ,(gb1,1)c2 ,(gb1,2)c1 ,(gb1,2)c2 ,(gb1,1)c3
)
and T,
decides whether T = T0 = e(g,g)
c1c2c3 or T = T1 = e(g,g)
d with random choices of c1,c2,c3,d ∈ Zp.
Assumption 5.3-2 Let ((p,G,GT ,e),g
b1,1 ,gb1,2 ,gb2) be the bilinear product group of basis vectors b1,1 =
(1,0),b1,2 = (1,a), and b2 = (a,−1). The Assumption 5.3-2 is stated as follows: given a challenge tuple
D=
(
(p,G,GT ,e), g
b1,1 ,gb1,2 ,gb2
)
and T,
decides whether T = T0 = e((g
b1,1)c1(gb2)c3 ,(gb1,2)c2) or T = T1 = e((g
b1,1)c1 ,(gb1,2)c2) with random choices
of c1,c2,c3 ∈ Zp.
Assumption 5.3-3 Let ((p,G,GT ,e),g
b1,1 ,gb1,2 ,gb2) be the bilinear product group of basis vectors b1,1 =
(1,0),b1,2 = (1,a), and b2 = (a,−1). The Assumption 5.3-3 is stated as follows: given a challenge tuple
D=
(
(p,G,GT ,e), g
b1,1 ,gb1,2 ,gb2 ,(gb1,2)c1 ,(gb1,2)c2 ,(gb1,1)c1c2(gb2)z1 ,(gb1,1)c1c2c3(gb2)z2
)
and T,
decides whether T = T0 = (g
b1,1)c3(gb2)z3 or T = T1 = (g
b1,1)d(gb2)z3 with random choices of c1,c2,c3,d ∈
Zp and z1,z2,z3 ∈ Zp.
Lemma 5.3.2. The above HVE construction is selectively secure under the Assumptions 5.3-1, 5.3-2, and
5.3-3.
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Proof. The proof of this lemma is directly obtained from [13] since the Assumptions 5.3-1, 5.3-2, and 5.3-
2 in prime order bilinear groups are correspond to the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH), Bilinear Subgroup
Decision (BSD), and Composite 3-party Diffie-Hellman (C3DH) assumptions in composite order bilinear
groups. That is, the proof of [13] can be exactly simulated using the vector operations in the Definition 5.2.1
and the Assumptions 5.3-1, 5.3-2, and 5.3-3.
Lemma 5.3.3. If the decisional BDH assumption holds, then the Assumption 5.3-1 also holds.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A that breaks the Assumption 5.3-1 with a non-negligible ad-
vantage. An algorithm B that solves the decisional BDH assumption using A is given: a challenge tuple
D = ((p,G,GT ,e),g,g
c1 ,gc2 ,gc3) and T where T = T0 = e(g,g)
c1c2c3 or T = T1 = e(g,g)
d . B first chooses
random values a ∈ Zp and computes
gb1,1 = (g,1), gb1,2 = (g,ga), gb2 = (ga,g−1),
(gb1,1)c1 = (gc1 ,1), (gb1,1)c2 = (gc2 ,1), (gb1,1)c3 = (gc3 ,1),
(gb1,2)c1 = (gc1 ,(gc1)a), (gb1,2)c2 = (gc2 ,(gc2)a).
Next, it gives the tuple D′ = ((p,G,GT ,e),g
b1,1 ,gb1,2 ,gb2 ,(gb1,1)c1 ,(gb1,1)c2 ,(gb1,2)c1 ,(gb1,2)c2 ,(gb1,1)c3) and
T to A. Then A outputs a guess γ ′. B also outputs γ ′. If the advantage of A is ε , then the advantage of B is
greater than ε since the distribution of the challenge tuple to A is equal to the Assumption 5.3-1.
Lemma 5.3.4. The Assumption 5.3-2 holds for all adversaries.
Proof. The equation e((gb1,1)c1(gb2)c3 ,(gb1,2)c2) = e((gb1,1)c1 ,(gb1,2)c2) holds by the orthogonality of basis
vectors such that e(gb2 ,gb1,2) = 1. Therefore, any adversary can not break the Assumption 5.3-2.
Lemma 5.3.5. If the decisional P3DH assumption holds, then the Assumption 5.3-3 also holds.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A that breaks the Assumption 5.3-3 with a non-negligible advan-
tage. An algorithm B that solves the decisional P3DH assumption using A is given: a challenge tuple D=
((p,G,GT ,e),(g, f ),(g
c1 , f c1),(gc2 , f c2),(gc1c2 f z1 ,gz1),(gc1c2c3 f z2 ,gz2)) and T where T = T0 = (g
c3 f z3 ,gz3)
or T = T1 = (g
d f z3 ,gz3). B first computes
gb1,1 = (g,1), gb1,2 = (g, f ), gb2 = ( f ,g−1), (gb1,2)c1 = (gc1 , f c1), (gb1,2)c2 = (gc2 , f c2),
(gb1,1)c1c2(gb2)z1 = (gc1c2 f z1 ,(gz1)−1), (gb1,1)c1c2c3(gb2)z2 = (gc1c2c3 f z2 ,(gz2)−1).
Intuitively, it sets a = dlog( f ). Next, it gives the tuple D′ = ((p,G,GT ,e),g
b1,1 ,gb1,2 ,gb2 ,(gb1,1)c1 ,(gb1,1)c2 ,
(gb1,2)c1 ,(gb1,2)c2 ,(gb1,1)c1c2c3) and T to A. Then A outputs a guess γ ′. B also outputs γ ′. If the advantage of
A is ε , then the advantage of B is greater than ε since the distribution of the challenge tuple toA is equal to
the Assumption 5.3-3.
5.4 Conversion 2: LL-HVE
In this section, we convert the HVE scheme of Lee and Lee [26] to prime order bilinear groups and prove
its selective model security under the decisional BDH and P3DH assumptions.
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5.4.1 Construction
Setup(1λ , l): The setup algorithm first generates the bilinear group G of prime order p of bit size Θ(λ ).
It chooses random values a1,a2,a3 ∈ Zp and sets basis vectors for bilinear product groups as b1,1 =
(1,0,a1), b1,2 = (1,a2,0), b2 = (a2,−1,a1a2 − a3), b3 = (a1,a3,−1). Next, it chooses random
exponents v′,w′1,w
′
2,{u
′
i,hi}
l
i=1,α ∈ Zp, and it computes the following values using the basis vectors
B1,1 = g
b1,1 , B1,2 = g
b1,2 , B2 = g
b2 , B3 = g
b3 ,
gv1 = Bv
′
1,1, g
w1,1 = B
w′1
1,1, g
w1,2 = B
w′2
1,1,
{
gu1,i = B
u′i
1,1, g
h1,i = B
h′i
1,1
}l
i=1
,
gv2 = Bv
′
1,2, g
w2,1 = B
w′1
1,2, g
w2,2 = B
w′2
1,2,
{
gu2,i = B
u′i
1,2, g
h2,i = B
h′i
1,2
}l
i=1
.
It keeps gv2 ,gw2,1 ,gw2,2 ,{gu2,i ,gh2,i}li=1,(g
b1,2)α as a secret key SK. Then it publishes a public key PK
using random blinding values zv,zw,1,zw,2,{zu,i,zh,i}
l
i=1 ∈ Zp as follows
PK =
(
B1,1, B1,2, B2, B3, V= g
v1B
zv
2 , W1 = g
w1,1B
zw,1
2 , W2 = g
w1,2B
zw,2
2 ,{
Ui = g
u1,iB
zu,i
2 , Hi = g
h1,iB
zh,i
2
}l
i=1
, Ω = e(gv1 ,gb1,2)α
)
.
GenToken(σ ,SK,PK): The token generation algorithm takes as input an attribute vector σ =(σ1, . . . ,σl)∈
Σl∗ and the secret key SK. Let S be the set of indexes that are not wild-card fields in the vector ~σ . It
selects random exponents r1,r2,r3 ∈Zp and random blinding values y1,y2,y3,y4 ∈Zp. Next it outputs
a token as
TK~σ =
(
K1 = (g
b1,2)α(gw2,1)r1(gw2,2)r2
(
∏
i∈S
((gu2,i)σigh2,i)
)r3
B
y1
3 ,
K2 = (g
v2)−r1By23 , K3 = (g
v2)−r2By33 , K4 = (g
v2)−r3By43
)
.
Encrypt(x,M,PK): The encryption algorithm takes as input an attribute vector x= (x1, . . . ,xl) ∈ Σ
l, a mes-
sage M ∈M⊆ GT , and the public key PK. It first chooses a random exponent t ∈ Zp and random
blinding values z1,z2,z3,{z4,i}
l
i=1 ∈ Zp. Then it outputs a ciphertext as
CT =
(
C0 = Ω
tM, C1 = V
tB
z1
2 , C2 =W
t
1B
z2
2 , C3 =W
t
2B
z3
2 ,
{
C4,i = (U
xi
i Hi)
tB
z4,i
2
}l
i=1
)
.
Query(CT,TK~σ ,PK): The query algorithm takes as input a ciphertext CT and a token TK~σ of a vector ~σ .
It first computes
M←C0 ·
(
e(C1,K1) · e(C2,K2) · e(C3,K3) · e(∏
i∈S
C4,i,K4)
)−1
.
If M /∈ M, it outputs ⊥ indicating that the predicate f~σ is not satisfied. Otherwise, it outputs M
indicating that the predicate f~σ is satisfied.
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5.4.2 Correctness
If f~σ (~x) = 1, then the following calculation shows that Query(CT,TK~σ ,PK) =M by the orthogonality of
basis vectors such that e(gb1,1 ,gb3) = 1,e(gb1,2 ,gb2) = 1,e(gb2 ,gb3) = 1.
e(C1,K1) · e(C2,K2) · e(C3,K3) · e(∏
i∈S
C4,i,K4)
= e((gv1)t ,(gb1,2)α(gw2,1)r1(gw2,2)r2
(
∏
i∈S
((gu2,i)σigh2,i)
)r3)·
e((gw1,1)t ,(gv2)−r1) · e((gw1,2)t ,(gv2)−r2) · e(∏
i∈S
((gu1,i)xigh1,i)t ,(gv2)−r3)
= e((gv1)t ,(gb1,2)α) · e(gv
′
,∏
i∈S
(gu
′
i)(σi−xi))tr3 = e(gv1 ,gb1,2)αt .
Otherwise, that is f~σ (~x) = 0, the probability of Query(CT,TK~σ ,PK) 6=⊥ is negligible by limiting |M| to
less than |GT |
1/4.
5.4.3 Security
Theorem 5.4.1. The above HVE construction is selectively secure under the decisional BDH and P3DH
assumptions.
The proof of this theorem is easily obtained from the following five Lemma 5.4.2, 5.4.3, 5.4.4, 5.4.5 and
5.4.6. Before presenting the five lemmas, we first introduce the following four assumptions. The HVE
scheme of Lee and Lee constructed in bilinear groups of composite n = p1p2p3 order, and its security was
proven under the decisional BDH, Bilinear Subgroup Decision (BSD), and the decisional C3DH assump-
tions [36]. In composite order bilinear groups, the decisional C3DH assumption imply the decisional C2DH
assumption that was introduced in [26]. However, in prime order bilinear groups, this implication is not
valid since the basis vectors for ciphertexts and tokens are different. Thus the decisional C3DH assump-
tion for ciphertexts and the decisional C2DH assumption for tokens should be treated as differently. These
assumptions in composite order bilinear groups are converted to the following Assumptions 5.4-1, 5.4-2,
5.4-3, and 5.4-4 using our conversion method.
Assumption 5.4-1 Let ((p,G,GT ,e),g
b1,1 ,gb1,2 ,gb2 ,gb3) be the bilinear product group of basis vectors
b1,1 = (1,0,a1),b1,2 = (1,a2,0),b2 = (a2,−1,a1a2− a3), and b3 = (a1,a3,−1). The Assumption 5.4-1
is stated as follows: given a challenge tuple
D=
(
(p,G,GT ,e), g
b1,1 ,gb1,2 ,gb2 ,gb3 ,(gb1,1)c1 ,(gb1,1)c2 ,(gb1,2)c1 ,(gb1,2)c2 ,(gb1,1)c3
)
and T,
decides whether T = T0 = e(g,g)
c1c2c3 or T = T1 = e(g,g)
d with random choices of c1,c2,c3,d ∈ Zp.
Assumption 5.4-2 Let ((p,G,GT ,e),g
b1,1 ,gb1,2 ,gb2 ,gb3) be the bilinear product group of basis vectors
b1,1 = (1,0,a1),b1,2 = (1,a2,0),b2 = (a2,−1,a1a2− a3), and b3 = (a1,a3,−1). The Assumption 5.4-2
is stated as follows: given a challenge tuple
D=
(
(p,G,GT ,e), g
b1,1 ,gb1,2 ,gb2 ,gb3
)
and T,
decides whether T = T0 = e((g
b1,1)c1(gb2)c3 ,(gb1,2)c2(gb3)c4) or T = T1 = e((g
b1,1)c1 ,(gb1,2)c2) with random
choices of c1,c2,c3,c4 ∈ Zp.
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Assumption 5.4-3 Let ((p,G,GT ,e),g
b1,1 ,gb1,2 ,gb2 ,gb3) be the bilinear product group of basis vectors
b1,1 = (1,0,a1),b1,2 = (1,a2,0),b2 = (a2,−1,a1a2− a3), and b3 = (a1,a3,−1). The Assumption 5.4-3
is stated as follows: given a challenge tuple
D=
(
(p,G,GT ,e), g
b1,1 ,gb1,2 ,gb2 ,gb3 ,(gb1,2)c1 ,(gb1,2)c2 ,(gb1,1)c1c2(gb2)z1 ,(gb1,1)c1c2c3(gb2)z2
)
and T,
decides whether T = T0 = (g
b1,1)c3(gb2)z3 or T = T1 = (g
b1,1)d(gb2)z3 with random choices of c1,c2,c3,d ∈
Zp and z1,z2,z3 ∈ Zp.
Assumption 5.4-4 Let ((p,G,GT ,e),g
b1,1 ,gb1,2 ,gb2 ,gb3) be the bilinear product group of basis vectors
b1,1 = (1,0,a1),b1,2 = (1,a2,0),b2 = (a2,−1,a1a2− a3), and b3 = (a1,a3,−1). The Assumption 5.4-4
is stated as follows: given a challenge tuple
D=
(
(p,G,GT ,e), g
b1,1 ,gb1,2 ,gb2 ,gb3 ,(gb1,2)c1(gb3)z1 ,(gb1,2)c2(gb3)z2
)
and T,
decides whether T = T0 = (g
b1,2)c1c2(gb3)z3 or T = T1 = (g
b1,2)d(gb3)z3 with random choices of c1,c2,d ∈Zp
and z1,z2,z3 ∈ Zp.
Lemma 5.4.2. The above HVE construction is selectively secure under the Assumptions 5.4-1, 5.4-2, 5.4-3,
and 5.4-4.
Proof. The proof of this lemma is directly obtained from [26] since the Assumptions 5.4-1, 5.4-2, 5.4-3, and
5.4-4 in prime order bilinear groups are corresponds to the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH), Bilinear Sub-
group Decision (BSD), Composite 3-party Diffie-Hellman (C3DH), and Composite 2-party Diffie-Hellman
(C2DH) assumptions in composite order bilinear groups.
Lemma 5.4.3. If the decisional BDH assumption holds, then the Assumption 5.4-1 also holds.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A that breaks the Assumption 5.4-1 with a non-negligible ad-
vantage. An algorithm B that solves the decisional BDH assumption using A is given: a challenge tuple
D = ((p,G,GT ,e),g,g
c1 ,gc2 ,gc3) and T where T = T0 = e(g,g)
c1c2c3 or T = T1 = e(g,g)
d . B first chooses
random values a1,a2,a3 ∈ Zp and sets
gb1,1 = (g,1,ga1 ), gb1,2 = (g,ga2 ,1), gb2 = (ga2 ,g−1,ga1a2−a3), gb3 = (ga1 ,ga3 ,g−1),
(gb1,1)c1 = (gc1 ,1,(gc1)a1), (gb1,1)c2 = (gc2 ,1,(gc2 )a1), (gb1,1)c3 = (gc3 ,1),
(gb1,2)c1 = (gc1 ,(gc1)a2 ,1), (gb1,2)c2 = (gc2 ,(gc2)a2 ,1).
Next, it gives the tuple D′ = ((p,G,GT ,e),g
b1,1 ,gb1,2 ,gb2 ,(gb1,1)c1 ,(gb1,1)c2 ,(gb1,2)c1 ,(gb1,2)c2 ,(gb1,1)c3) and
T to A. Then A outputs a guess γ ′. B also outputs γ ′. If the advantage of A is ε , then the advantage of B is
greater than ε since the distribution of the challenge tuple to A is equal to the Assumption 5.4-1.
Lemma 5.4.4. The Assumption 5.4-2 holds for all adversaries.
Proof. The equation e((gb1,1)c1(gb2)c3 ,(gb1,2)c2(gb3)c4) = e((gb1,1)c1 ,(gb1,2)c2) holds by the orthogonality of
basis vectors such that e(gb1,1 ,gb3) = 1,e(gb2 ,gb1,2) = 1, and e(gb2 ,gb3) = 1. Therefore, any adversary can
not break the Assumption 5.4-2.
Lemma 5.4.5. If the decisional P3DH assumption holds, then the Assumption 5.4-3 also holds.
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Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A that breaks the Assumption 5.4-3 with a non-negligible ad-
vantage. An algorithm B that solves the decisional P3DH assumption using A is given: a challenge tuple
D= ((p,G,GT ,e),(g, f ),(g
c1 , f c1),(gc2 , f c2),(gc1c2 f z1 ,gz1),(gc1c2c3 f z2 ,gz2)) and T = Tγ = (Tγ ,1,Tγ ,2)where
T = T0 = (g
c3 f z3 ,gz3) or T = T1 = (g
d f z3 ,gz3). B first chooses random values a1,a3 ∈ Zp and sets
gb1,1 = (g,1,ga1), gb1,2 = (g, f ,1), gb2 = ( f ,g−1, f a1g−a3), gb3 = (ga1 ,ga3 ,g−1),
(gb1,2)c1 = (gc1 , f c1 ,1), (gb1,2)c2 = (gc2 , f c2 ,1),
(gb1,1)c1c2(gb2)z1 = (gc1c2 f z1 ,(gz1)−1,(gc1c2 f z1)a1(gz1)−a3),
(gb1,1)c1c2c3(gb2)z2 = (gc1c2c3 f z2 ,(gz2)−1,(gc1c2c3 f z2)a1(gz2)−a3),
T ′ = (Tγ ,1,Tγ ,2,(Tγ ,1)
a1(Tγ ,2)
−a3).
Intuitively, it sets a2= dlog( f ). Next, it gives the tupleD
′=((p,G,GT ,e),g
b1,1 ,gb1,2 ,gb2 ,gb3 ,(gb1,2)c1 ,(gb1,2)c2 ,
(gb1,1)c1c2(gb2)z1 ,(gb1,1)c1c2c3(gb2)z2) and T ′ to A. Then A outputs a guess γ ′. B also outputs γ ′. If the ad-
vantage ofA is ε , then the advantage of B is greater than ε since the distribution of the challenge tuple toA
is equal to the Assumption 5.4-3.
Lemma 5.4.6. If the decisional P3DH assumption holds, then the Assumption 5.4-4 also holds.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A that breaks the Assumption 5.4-4 with a non-negligible ad-
vantage. An algorithm B that solves the decisional P3DH assumption using A is given: a challenge tuple
D = ((p,G,GT ,e),(g, f ),(g
c1 , f c1),(gc2 , f c2),(gc1c2 f z1 ,gz1),(gc3 f z2 ,gz2)) and T = Tγ = (Tγ ,1,Tγ ,2) where
T = T0 = (g
c1c2c3 f z3 ,gz3) or T = T1 = (g
d f z3 ,gz3). B first chooses random values a2,a3 ∈ Zp and sets
gb1,1 = (g,1, f ), gb1,2 = (g,ga2 ,1), gb2 = (ga2 ,g−1,ga3), gb3 = ( f , f a2g−a3 ,g−1),
(gb1,2)c
′
1(gb3)z1 = (gc1c2 f z1 ,(gc1c2 f z1)a2(gz1)−a3 ,(gz1)−1),
(gb1,2)c
′
2(gb3)z2 = (gc3 f z2 ,(gc3 f z2)a2(gz2)−a3 ,(gz2)−1),
T ′ = (Tγ ,1,(Tγ ,1)
a2(Tγ ,2)
−a3 ,(Tγ ,2)
−1).
Intuitively, it sets a′1 = dlog( f ),a
′
2 = a2,a
′
3 = a1a2−a3 and c
′
1 = c1c2,c
′
2 = c3 where a
′
1,a
′
2,a
′
3 are elements of
basis vectors for the Assumption 5-4. Next, it gives the tuple D′ = ((p,G,GT ,e),g
b1,1 ,gb1,2 ,gb2 ,gb3 ,(gb1,1)c
′
1
(gb2)z1 ,(gb1,1)c
′
2(gb2)z2) and T ′ to A. Then A outputs a guess γ ′. B also outputs γ ′. If the advantage of A is
ε , then the advantage of B is greater than ε since the distribution of the challenge tuple to A is equal to the
Assumption 5.4-4.
5.5 Conversion 3: SW-dHVE
In this section, we convert the delegatable HVE scheme of Shi and Waters [36] to prime order bilinear
groups and prove its selective model security under the decisional BDH and P3DH assumptions.
5.5.1 Construction
Let Σ be a finite set of attributes and let ?,∗ be two special symbol not in Σ. Define Σ?,∗ = Σ∪{?,∗}. The
symbol ? denotes a delegatable field, i.e., a field where one is allowed to fill in an arbitrary value and perform
delegation. The symbol ∗ denotes a wild-card field or “don’t care” field.
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Setup(1λ , l): The setup algorithm first generates the bilinear group G of prime order p of bit size Θ(λ ).
It chooses random values a1,a2,a3 ∈ Zp and sets basis vectors for bilinear product groups as b1,1 =
(1,0,a1), b1,2 = (1,a2,0), b2 = (a2,−1,a1a2 − a3), b3 = (a1,a3,−1). Next, it chooses random
exponents v′,w′1,w
′
2,{u
′
i,h
′
i}
l
i=1,α ∈ Zp, and it computes the following values using the basis vectors
B1,1 = g
b1,1 , B1,2 = g
b1,2 , B2 = g
b2 , B3 = g
b3 ,
gv1 = Bv
′
1,1, g
w1,1 = B
w′1
1,1, g
w1,2 = B
w′2
1,1,
{
gu1,i = B
u′i
1,1, g
h1,i = B
h′i
1,1
}l
i=1
,
gv2 = Bv
′
1,2, g
w2,1 = B
w′1
1,2, g
w2,2 = B
w′2
1,2,
{
gu2,i = B
u′i
1,2, g
h2,i = B
h′i
1,2
}l
i=1
.
It keeps gv2 ,{gu2,i ,gh2,i ,gw2,i}li=1,(g
b1,2)α as a secret key SK. Then it publishes a public key PK using
random blinding values zv,zw,1,zw,2,{zu,i,zh,i}
l
i=1 ∈ Zp as follows
PK =
(
B1,1, B1,2, B2, B3, V= g
v1B
zv
2 , W1 = g
w1,1B
zw,1
2 , W2 = g
w1,2B
zw,2
2 ,{
Ui = g
u1,iB
zu,i
2 , Hi = g
h1,iB
zh,i
2
}l
i=1
, Ω = e(gv1 ,gb1,2)α
)
.
GenToken(σ ,SK,PK): The token generation algorithm takes as input an attribute vector σ =(σ1, . . . ,σl)∈
Σl?,∗ and the secret key SK. Let S be the set of indexes that are not delegatable fields and wild-card
fields in the vector ~σ . It first selects random exponents r1,r2,{r3,i}i∈S ∈ Zp and random blinding
values y1,y2,y3,{y4,i}i∈S ∈ Zp. Then it computes decryption components as
K1 = (g
b1,2)α(gw2,1)r1(gw2,2)r2 ∏
i∈S
((gu2,i)σigh2,i)r3,iBy13 ,
K2 = (g
v2)−r1By23 , K3 = (g
v2)−r2By33 ,
{
K4,i = (g
v2)−r3,iB
y4,i
3
}
i∈S
.
Let S? be the set of indexes that are delegatable fields. It selects random exponents {s1, j,s2, j,{s3, j,i}}∈
Zp and random blinding values {y1, j,u,y1, j,h,y2, j,y3, j,{y4, j,i}} ∈ Zp. Next, it computes delegation
components as
∀ j ∈ S? :L1, j,u = (g
u2,i)s3, j, jB
y1, j,u
3 ,
L1, j,h = (g
w2,1)s1, j(gw2,2)s2, j ∏
i∈S
((gu2,i)σigh2,i)s3, j,i(gh2, j)s3, j, jB
y1, j,h
3 ,
L2, j = (g
v2)−s1, jB
y2, j
3 , L3, j = (g
v2)−s2, jB
y3, j
3 ,
{
L4, j,i = (g
v2)−s3, j,iB
y4, j,i
3
}
i∈S∪{ j}
.
Finally, it outputs a token as
TKσ =
(
K1, K2, K3, {K4,i}i∈S,
{
L1, j,u, L1, j,h, L2, j, L3, j, {L4, j,i}i∈S∪{ j}
}
j∈S?
)
.
Delegate(σ ′,TKσ ,PK): The delegation algorithm takes as input an attribute vector σ
′= (σ1, . . . ,σl)∈ Σ
l
?,∗
and a token TKσ . Without loss of generality, we assume that σ
′ fixes only one delegatable field of
σ . It is clear that we can perform delegation on multiple fields if we have an algorithm to perform
delegation on one field. Suppose σ ′ fixes the k-th index of σ . If the k-th index of σ ′ is set to ∗, that is,
a wild-card field, then it can perform delegation by simply removing the delegation components that
correspond to k-th index. Otherwise, that is, if the k-th index of σ ′ is set to some value in Σ, then it
perform delegation as follows.
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Let S be the set of indexes that are not delegatable fields and wild-card fields in the vector σ ′. Note
that k ∈ S. It selects random exponents µ ,y1,y2,y3,{y4,i}i∈S ∈ Zp and updates the token as
K˜1 =K1(L
σk
1,k,uL1,k,h)
µB
y1
3 , K˜2 =K2L
µ
2,kB
y2
3 , K˜3 =K3L
µ
3,kB
y3
3 ,
K˜4,k = L
µ
4,k,kB
y4,k
3 ,
{
K˜4,i =K4,iL
µ
4,k,iB
y4,i
3
}
i∈S\{k}
.
Let S? be the set of indexes that are delegatable fields in the vector σ
′. It selects random exponents
{τ j,y1, j,u,y1, j,h,y2, j,y3, j,{y4, j,i}i∈S∪{ j}} j∈S? ∈ Zp and re-randomize the delegation components of the
token as
∀ j ∈ S? :L˜1, j,u = L
µ
1, j,uB
y1, j,u
3 , L˜1, j,h = L
µ
1, j,h(L
σk
1,k,uL1,k,h)
τ jB
y1, j,h
3 ,
L˜2, j = L
µ
2, jL
τ j
2, jB
y2, j
3 , L˜3, j = L
µ
3, jL
τ j
3, jB
y3, j
3 ,
L˜4, j, j = L
µ
4, j, jB
y4, j, j
3 , L˜4, j,k = L
τ j
4, j,kB
y4, j,k
3 ,
{
L˜4, j,i = L
µ
4, j,iL
τ j
4, j,kB
y4, j,i
3
}
i∈S\{k}
.
Finally, it outputs a token as
TKσ ′ =
(
K˜1, K˜2, K˜3, {K˜4,i}i∈S,
{
L˜1, j,h, L˜1, j,u, L˜2, j, L˜3, j, {L˜4, j,i}i∈S∪{ j}
}
j∈S?
)
.
Encrypt(x,M,PK): The encryption algorithm takes as input an attribute vector x= (x1, . . . ,xl) ∈ Σ
l, a mes-
sage M ∈M⊆ GT , and the public key PK. It first chooses a random exponent t ∈ Zp and random
blinding values z1,z2,z3,{z4,i}
l
i=1 ∈ Zp. Then it outputs a ciphertext as
CT =
(
C0 = Ω
tM, C1 = V
tB
z1
2 , C2 =W
t
1B
z2
2 , C3 =W
t
2B
z3
2 ,
{
C4,i = (U
xi
i Hi)
tB
z4,i
2
}l
i=1
)
.
Query(CT,TK~σ ,PK): The query algorithm takes as input a ciphertext CT and a token TK~σ of a vector ~σ .
It first computes
M←C0 ·
(
e(C1,K1) · e(C2,K2) · e(C3,K3) ·∏
i∈S
e(C4,i,K4,i)
)−1
.
If M /∈ M, it outputs ⊥ indicating that the predicate f~σ is not satisfied. Otherwise, it outputs M
indicating that the predicate f~σ is satisfied.
5.5.2 Correctness
If f~σ (~x) = 1, then the following calculation shows that Query(CT,TK~σ ,PK) =M by the orthogonality of
basis vectors such that e(gb1,1 ,gb3) = 1,e(gb1,2 ,gb2) = 1, and e(gb2 ,gb3) = 1.
e(C1,K1) · e(C2,K2) · e(C3,K3) ·∏
i∈S
e(C4,i,K4,i)
= e((gv1)t ,(gb1,2)α(gw2,1)r1(gw2,2)r2 ∏
i∈S
((gu2,i)σigh2,i)r3,i)·
e((gw1,1)t ,(gv2)−r1) · e((gw1,2)t ,(gv2)−r2) ·∏
i∈S
e(((gu1,i)xigh1,i)t ,(gv2)−r3,i)
= e((gv1)t ,(gb1,2)α) ·∏
i∈S
e(gv
′
,(gu
′
i)(σi−xi))tr3,i = e(gv1 ,gb1,2)αt .
Otherwise, that is f~σ (~x) = 0, the probability of Query(CT,TK~σ ,PK) 6=⊥ is negligible by limiting |M| to
less than |GT |
1/4.
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5.5.3 Security
Theorem 5.5.1. The above dHVE construction is selectively secure under the decisional BDH and P3DH
assumptions.
The proof of this theorem is easily obtained from the following five Lemma 5.5.2, 5.5.3, 5.5.4, 5.5.5 and
5.5.6. Before presenting the five lemmas, we first introduce the following four assumptions. The HVE
scheme of Shi and Waters constructed in bilinear groups of composite n = p1p2p3 order, and its security
was proven under the decisional BDH, Bilinear Subgroup Decision (BSD), and the decisional C3DH as-
sumptions [36]. In composite order bilinear groups, the decisional C3DH assumption imply the decisional
l-C3DH assumption that was introduced in [36]. However, in prime order bilinear groups, this implication
is not valid since the basis vectors for ciphertexts and tokens are different. Thus the decisional C3DH as-
sumption for ciphertexts and the decisional C3DH assumption for tokens should be treated as differently.
These assumptions in composite order bilinear groups are converted to the following Assumptions 5.5-1,
5.5-2, 5.5-3, and 5.5-4 using our conversion method.
Assumption 5.5-1 Let ((p,G,GT ,e),g
b1,1 ,gb1,2 ,gb2 ,gb3) be the bilinear product group of basis vectors
b1,1 = (1,0,a1),b1,2 = (1,a2,0),b2 = (a2,−1,a1a2− a3), and b3 = (a1,a3,−1). The Assumption 5.5-1
is stated as follows: given a challenge tuple
D=
(
(p,G,GT ,e), g
b1,1 ,gb1,2 ,gb2 ,gb3 ,(gb1,1)c1 ,(gb1,1)c2 ,(gb1,2)c1 ,(gb1,2)c2 ,(gb1,1)c3
)
and T,
decides whether T = T0 = e(g,g)
c1c2c3 or T = T1 = e(g,g)
d with random choices of c1,c2,c3,d ∈ Zp.
Assumption 5.5-2 Let ((p,G,GT ,e),g
b1,1 ,gb1,2 ,gb2 ,gb3) be the bilinear product group of basis vectors
b1,1 = (1,0,a1),b1,2 = (1,a2,0),b2 = (a2,−1,a1a2− a3), and b3 = (a1,a3,−1). The Assumption 5.5-2
is stated as follows: given a challenge tuple
D=
(
(p,G,GT ,e), g
b1,1 ,gb1,2 ,gb2 ,gb3
)
and T,
decides whether T = T0 = e((g
b1,1)c1(gb2)c3 ,(gb1,2)c2(gb3)c4) or T = T1 = e((g
b1,1)c1 ,(gb1,2)c2) with random
choices of c1,c2,c3,c4 ∈ Zp.
Assumption 5.5-3 Let ((p,G,GT ,e),g
b1,1 ,gb1,2 ,gb2 ,gb3) be the bilinear product group of basis vectors
b1,1 = (1,0,a1),b1,2 = (1,a2,0),b2 = (a2,−1,a1a2− a3), and b3 = (a1,a3,−1). The Assumption 5.5-3
is stated as follows: given a challenge tuple
D=
(
(p,G,GT ,e), g
b1,1 ,gb1,2 ,gb2 ,gb3 ,(gb1,2)c1 ,(gb1,2)c2 ,(gb1,1)c1c2(gb2)z1 ,(gb1,1)c1c2c3(gb2)z2
)
and T,
decides whether T = T0 = (g
b1,1)c3(gb2)z3 or T = T1 = (g
b1,1)d(gb2)z3 with random choices of c1,c2,c3,d ∈
Zp, and z1,z2,z3 ∈ Zp.
Assumption 5.5-4 Let ((p,G,GT ,e),g
b1,1 ,gb1,2 ,gb2 ,gb3) be the bilinear product group of basis vectors
b1,1 = (1,0,a1),b1,2 = (1,a2,0),b2 = (a2,−1,a1a2− a3), and b3 = (a1,a3,−1). The Assumption 5.5-4
is stated as follows: given a challenge tuple
D=
(
(p,G,GT ,e), g
b1,1 ,gb1,2 ,gb2 ,gb3 ,(gb1,1)c1 ,(gb1,1)c2 ,(gb1,2)c1c2(gb3)z1 ,(gb1,2)c1c2c3(gb3)z2
)
and T,
decides whether T = T0 = (g
b1,2)c3(gb3)z3 or T = T1 = (g
b1,2)d(gb3)z3 with random choices of c1,c2,c3,d ∈
Zp, and z1,z2,z3 ∈ Zp.
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Lemma 5.5.2. The above dHVE construction is selectively secure under the Assumptions 5.5-1, 5.5-2, 5.5-3,
and 5.5-4.
Proof. The proof of this lemma is directly obtained from [36] since the Assumptions 5.5-1, 5.5-2, 5.5-3,
and 5.5-4 in prime order bilinear groups are correspond to the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH), Bilinear Sub-
group Decision (BSD), Composite 3-party Diffie-Hellman (C3DH), and Composite 3-party Diffie-Hellman
(C3DH) assumptions in composite order bilinear groups.
Lemma 5.5.3. If the decisional BDH assumption holds, then the Assumption 5.5-1 also holds.
Lemma 5.5.4. The Assumption 5.5-2 holds for all adversaries.
Lemma 5.5.5. If the decisional P3DH assumption holds, then the Assumption 5.5-3 also holds.
The Assumptions 5.5-1, 5.5-2, and 5.5-3 are the same as the Assumptions 5.4-1, 5.4-2, and 5.4-3. Thus we
omits the proof of Lemma 5.5.3, 5.5.4, 5.5.5.
Lemma 5.5.6. If the decisional P3DH assumption holds, then the Assumption 5.5-4 also holds.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A that breaks the Assumption 5.5-4 with a non-negligible ad-
vantage. An algorithm B that solves the decisional P3DH assumption using A is given: a challenge tuple
D= ((p,G,GT ,e),(g, f ),(g
c1 , f c1),(gc2 , f c2),(gc1c2 f z1 ,gz1),(gc1c2c3 f z2 ,gz2)) and T = Tγ = (Tγ ,1,Tγ ,2)where
T = T0 = (g
c3 f z3 ,gz3) or T = T1 = (g
d f z3 ,gz3). B first chooses random values a2,a3 ∈ Zp and sets
gb1,1 = (g,1, f ), gb1,2 = (g,ga2 ,1), gb2 = (ga2 ,g−1,ga3), gb3 = ( f , f a2g−a3 ,g−1),
(gb1,1)c1 = (gc1 ,1, f c1), (gb1,1)c2 = (gc2 ,1, f c2),
(gb1,2)c1c2(gb3)z1 = (gc1c2 f z1 ,(gc1c2 f z1)a2(gz1)−a3 ,(gz1)−1),
(gb1,2)c1c2c3(gb3)z2 = (gc1c2c3 f z2 ,(gc1c2c3 f z2)a2(gz2)−a3 ,(gz2)−1),
T ′ = (Tγ ,1,(Tγ ,1)
a2(Tγ ,2)
−a3 ,(Tγ ,2)
−1).
Intuitively, it sets a′1 = dlog( f ),a
′
2 = a2,a
′
3 = a1a2− a3 where a
′
1,a
′
2,a
′
3 are elements of basis vectors for
the Assumption 5.5-4. Next, it gives the tuple D′ = ((p,G,GT ,e),g
b1,1 ,gb1,2 ,gb2 ,gb3 ,(gb1,1)c1 ,(gb1,1)c2 ,
(gb1,2)c1c2(gb3)z1 ,(gb1,2)c1c2c3(gb3)z2) and T ′ to A. Then A outputs a guess γ ′. B also outputs γ ′. If the
advantage of A is ε , then the advantage of B is greater than ε since the distribution of the challenge tuple to
A is equal to the Assumption 5.5-4.
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Chapter 6
Fully Secure HVE with Short Tokens
6.1 Overview
In this chapter, we propose a fully secure HVE scheme with short tokens. Our construction based on
composite order bilinear groups of products of four primes and proved under four static assumptions.
The full security model is the right security model for predicate encryption. However, it is not easy to
provide full security model with reasonable security reduction loss. Recently, Waters proposed a novel proof
technique called the dual system encryption [40]. In the dual system encryption, the security proof consists
of hybrid games that change the original security game to a new game that can not be distinguishable from
the adversary’s view.
The dual system encryption was very successful to prove the full security model of hierarchical identity-
based encryption, attribute-based encryption, and public-key broadcast encryption. However, this technique
does not work well in predicate encryption. Main reason of this difficulty is that predicate encryption should
provide the attribute hiding property that guarantees the anonymity of the ciphertexts and the adversary of
predicate encryption can query a predicate that satisfies with the challenge ciphertext.
To overcome this problem, we restrict the adversary’s capability as he can only query predicates f such
that f (x0) = f (x1) = 0 where x0,x1 are the challenge vectors. That is, the adversary can not query a predicate
that satisfies with the challenge ciphertext.
6.2 HVE in Composite Order Groups
In this section, we construct an efficient HVE scheme in composite order bilinear groups and prove its full
model security under static assumptions.
6.2.1 Construction
Let Σ = Zm for some integer m and set Σ∗ = Zm∪{∗}. Our scheme is described as follows.
Setup(1λ , l): The setup algorithm first generates the bilinear group G of composite order n = p1p2p3p4
where p1, p2, p3 and p4 are random primes of bit size Θ(λ ). It chooses random elements g,{ui,hi}
l
i=1 ∈
Gp1 ,Z ∈ Gp2 ,Y ∈ Gp3 and a random exponent α ∈ Zp1 . It keeps g,g
α ,{ui,hi}
l
i=1,Y as a master key
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MK. Next, it selects random elements Zv,{Zu,i,Zh,i}
l
i=1 ∈Gp2 and publishes a public key PK as
PK =
(
V = gZv,
{
Ui = uiZu,i, Hi = hiZh,i
}l
i=1
, Z, Ω = e(g,g)α
)
.
GenToken(σ ,SK,PK): The token generation algorithm takes as input a vector σ = (σ1, . . . ,σl) ∈ Σ
l
∗ and
the secret key SK. Let S be the set of indexes that are not wild cards in the vector σ . It selects a
random exponent r ∈ Zn and random elements Y1,Y2 ∈Gp3 . Then it outputs a token as
TKσ =
(
K1 = g
α(∏
i∈S
u
σi
i hi)
rY1, K2 = g
rY2
)
.
Encrypt(x,M,PK): The encryption algorithm takes as input a vector x = (x1, . . . ,xl) ∈ Σ
l , a message M ∈
M ⊆ GT , and the public key PK. It first chooses a random exponent t ∈ Zn and random elements
Z1,{Z2,i}
l
i=1 ∈Gp2 . Then it outputs a ciphertext as
CT =
(
C0 = Ω
tM, C1 =V
tZ1,
{
C2,i = (U
xi
i Hi)
tZ2,i
}l
i=1
)
.
Query(CT,TKσ ,PK): The query algorithm takes as input a ciphertext CT and a token TKσ of a vector σ .
It first computes
M←C0 · e(C1,K1)
−1 · e(∏
i∈S
C2,i,K2).
If M /∈ M, it outputs ⊥ indicating that the predicate fσ is not satisfied. Otherwise, it outputs M
indicating that the predicate fσ is satisfied.
6.2.2 Correctness
If fσ (x) = 1, then the following calculations shows that Query(CT,TKσ ,PK) =M as
e(C1,K1)
−1 · e(∏
i∈S
C2,i,K2) =e(V
tZ1,g
α(∏
i∈S
u
σi
i hi)
rY1)
−1 · e(∏
i∈S
(U xii Hi)
tZ2,i,g
rY2)
=e(gt ,gα)−1 · e((∏
i∈S
u
(−σi+xi)
i hi)
r,gt) = e(g,g)−αt .
Otherwise, that is fσ (x) = 0, then the probability of Query(CT,TKσ ,PK) 6=⊥ is negligible by limiting |M|
to less than |GT |
1/4.
6.2.3 Complexity Assumptions
We introduce four static assumptions under composite order bilinear groups.
Assumption 1 (Subgroup Decision Assumption) Let (n,G,GT ,e) be a description of the bilinear group of
composite order n= p1p2p3p4. Let gp1 ,gp2 ,gp3 ,gp4 be generators of subgroups of order p1, p2, p3, p4 of G
respectively. The Assumption 1 is stated as follows: given a challenge tuple
D= ((n,G,GT ,e), gp1 ,gp2 ,gp3) and T,
decides whether T = T0 = Z1 ∈Gp2 or T = T1 = Z1R1 ∈Gp2p4 with random choices of Z1 ∈Gp2 ,R1 ∈Gp4 .
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Assumption 2 Let (n,G,GT ,e) be a description of the bilinear group of composite order n= p1p2p3p4. Let
gp1 ,gp2 ,gp3 ,gp4 be generators of subgroups of order p1, p2, p3, p4 of G respectively. The Assumption 2 is
stated as follows: given a challenge tuple
D= ((n,G,GT ,e), gp1 ,gp2 ,gp3 ,X1R1,Y1R2) and T,
decides whether T = T0 = X2Y2 or T = T1 = X2Y2R3 with random choices of X1,X2 ∈ Gp1 , Y1,Y2 ∈ Gp3 ,
R1,R2,R3 ∈Gp4 .
Assumption 3 Let (n,G,GT ,e) be a description of the bilinear group of composite order n= p1p2p3p4. Let
gp1 ,gp2 ,gp3 ,gp4 be generators of subgroups of order p1, p2, p3, p4 of G respectively. The Assumption 2 is
stated as follows: given a challenge tuple
D= ((n,G,GT ,e), gp1 ,gp2 ,gp3 ,gp4 ,g
a
p1
Z1,g
a
p1
Y1R1,Y2R1,g
b
p1
Z2R2) and T,
decides whether T = T0 = g
ab
p1
Z3R3 or T = T1 = g
c
p1
Z3R3 with random choices of a,b,c ∈ Zp1 , Z1,Z2,Z3 ∈
Gp2 , Y1,Y2 ∈Gp3 , R1,R2,R3 ∈Gp4 .
Assumption 4 Let (n,G,GT ,e) be a description of the bilinear group of composite order n= p1p2p3p4. Let
gp1 ,gp2 ,gp3 ,gp4 be generators of subgroups of order p1, p2, p3, p4 of G respectively. The Assumption 3 is
stated as follows: given a challenge tuple
D= ((n,G,GT ,e), gp1 ,gp2 ,gp3 ,gp4 ,g
a
p1
R1,g
b
p1
R2) and T,
decides whether T = T0 = e(gp1 ,gp1)
ab or T = T1 = e(gp1 ,gp1)
c with random choices of a,b,c,d ∈ Zp1 ,
R1,R2 ∈Gp4 .
6.2.4 Security
We describe a semi-functional ciphertext and a semi-functional token. They are not used in a real system,
but they are used in the proof of its security. We let gp4 be a generator of the subgroup Gp4 . Let (K
′
1,K
′
2) be
a normal token and y,zk be random exponents in Zn. Then the semi-functional token is generated as
semi-SKσ =
(
K1 = K
′
1 ·g
yzk
p4
, K2 = K
′
2 ·g
y
p4
)
.
Let (C′0,C
′
1,{C
′
2,i}) be a normal ciphertext and x,zc,1, . . . ,zc,l be random exponents in Zn. Then the semi-
functional ciphertext is generated as
semi-CT =
(
C0 =C
′
0, C1 =C
′
1 ·g
x
p4
, {C2,i =C
′
2,i ·g
xzc,i
p4 }
l
i=1
)
.
Note that if a semi-functional token is used to decrypt a semi-functional ciphertext, the decrypt algorithm
will output the blinding factor multiplied by the additional term e(gp4 ,gp4)
xy(zk−∑i∈S zc,i). If zk = ∑i∈S zc,i, the
the decrypt algorithm will still work.
Theorem 6.2.1. The above HVE construction is fully secure (match revealing) under the Assumptions 1, 2,
3, and 4.
Proof. The proof uses a sequence of games. The first game will be the original security game and the last
one will be a game such that the adversary has no advantage. We define the games as follows.
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Game0. This game is the original full security game. Note that the private keys and the challenge ciphertext
are normal.
Game1. This game is almost identical to Game0 except that the challenge ciphertext of a challenge vector
xγ is semi-functional.
Game2. This game is the same with the Game1 except that the tokens will be semi-functional. At this
moment, the tokens and the challenge ciphertexts are all semi-functional.
Game3. In this game we will replace the challenge semi-functional ciphertext components {C2,i}
l
i=1 to
random elements in Gp1p2p4 . In this case, the challenge ciphertext gives no information about the challenge
vector xγ .
Game4. We now define a new game Game4. This game differs from Game3 in that the semi-functional
challenge ciphertext component C0 is replaced by a random element in GT,p1 . Note that in Game4, the
challenge ciphertext gives no information about the vector xγ and the encrypted messageMγ . Therefore, the
adversary can win this game with probability at most 1/2.
Through the following four lemmas, we prove that it is hard to distinguish Gamei−1 from Gamei under
the given assumptions. Thus, the proof is easily obtained by the following four lemmas. This completes our
proof.
Lemma 6.2.2. If the Assumption 1 holds, then no polynomial-time adversary can distinguish between
Game0 and Game1 with a non-negligible advantage.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A that distinguishes between Game0 and Game1 with a non-
negligible advantage. The simulator B that solves the Assumption 1 using A is given: a challenge tuple
D= ((n,G,GT ,e),gp1 ,gp2 ,gp3) and T where T = Z1 ∈Gp2 or T = Z1R1 ∈Gp2p4 . Then B that interacts with
A is described as follows.
Setup: B first chooses random elements {ui,hi}
l
i=1 ∈Gp1 and a random exponent α ∈Zn. It selects random
elements Zv,{Zu,i,Zh,i}
l
i=1 ∈Gp2 and publishes a public key as
V = gp1Zv, {Ui = uiZu,i, Hi = hiZh,i}
l
i=1, Z = gp2 , Ω = e(gp1 ,gp1)
α .
Query 1: A adaptively requests a token query. B simply runs the token generation algorithm to create a
normal token using the master key. Note that it can only create the normal tokens since it does not
known gp4 .
Challenge: A submits two vector x0,x1 and two messages M0,M1. B flips a random coin γ internally, and
it chooses random exponents t,{zc,i}
l
i=1 ∈ Zn. Then it outputs a ciphertext using random elements
{Z′2,i}
l
i=1 ∈Gp2 as
C0 = Ω
tMγ , C1 =V
tT, {C2,i = (U
xγ,i
i Hi)
tT zc,iZ′2,i}
l
i=1.
If T = Z1 ∈ Gp2 , then B is playing Game0. Otherwise, it is playing Game1. Note that it implicitly
sets gxp4 = R1.
Query 2: Same as Query Phase 1.
Guess: A outputs a guess γ ′. If γ = γ ′, it outputs 0. Otherwise, it outputs 1.
This completes our proof.
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Lemma 6.2.3. If the Assumption 2 holds, then no polynomial-time adversary can distinguish between
Game1 and Game2 with a non-negligible advantage.
Proof. Suppose that an adversary makes at most q private key queries. We define a sequence of games
Game1,0,Game1,1, . . . ,Game1,q where Game1,0 = Game1. In Game1,i, for all j-th private key query
such that j > i, a normal private key is given to the adversary. However, for all j-th private key query such
that j ≤ i, a semi-functional private key is given to the adversary. It is obvious that Game1,q is equal with
Game2.
Suppose there exists an adversary A that distinguishes between Game1,k−1 and Game1,k with a non-
negligible advantage. A simulator B that solves the Assumption 2 using A is given: a challenge tuple
D = ((n,G,GT ,e),gp1 ,gp2 ,gp3 ,X1R1,Y1R2) and T where T = X2Y2 or T = X2Y2R3. Then B that interacts
with A is described as follows.
Setup: B first chooses random exponents {u′i,h
′
i}
l
i=1,α ∈ Zn and sets {ui = g
u′i
p1 ,hi = g
h′i
p1}
l
i=1,Z = gp2 ,Y =
gp3 . It selects random elements Zv,{Zu,i,Zh,i}
l
i=1 ∈Gp2 and publishes a public key as
V = gp1Zv, {Ui = uiZu,i, Hi = hiZh,i}
l
i=1, Z, Ω = e(gp1 ,gp1)
α .
Query 1: A adaptively requests a token query for a vector σ = (σ1, . . . ,σl) ∈ Σ
l
∗. If this is a ρ-th token
query, then B handles this query as follows.
Case ρ < k : It selects random exponents r,y,zk ∈ Zn. Then it chooses random elements Y
′
1,Y
′
2 ∈Gp3
and outputs a semi-functional token as
K1 = g
α
p1
(∏
i∈S
u
σi
i hi)
r(Y1R2)
yzkY ′1, K2 = g
r
p1
(Y1R2)
yY ′2.
Case ρ = k : It selects a random element Y ′1 ∈Gp3 and outputs a token as
K1 = g
α
p1
T∑i∈S(u
′
iσi+h
′
i)Y ′1, K2 = T.
If T =X2Y2, then B is playing Game1,k−1. Otherwise, it is playing Game1,k. Note that it implic-
itly sets r = dlog(X2),y = dlog(R3), and zk = ∑i∈S(u
′
iσi+h
′
i). It is obvious that the distribution
of token is correct as follows
gαp1(∏
i∈S
u
σi
i hi)
rY1 = g
α
p1
g
∑i∈S(u
′
iσi+h
′
i)r
p1 Y1 = g
α
p1
(X2Y2)
∑i∈S(u
′
iσi+h
′
i)Y ′1, g
r
p1
Y2 = X2Y2.
Case ρ > k : It simply runs the token generation algorithm to create a normal token since it knows
the master key.
Challenge: A submits two vectors x0,x1 and two messages M0,M1. B flips a random coin γ internally and
selects random elements Z′1,{Z2,i}
l
i=1 ∈Gp2 . Then it outputs a semi-functional ciphertext as
C0 = e(X1R1,gp1)
αMγ , C1 = (X1R1)Z
′
1, {C2,i = (X1R1)
u′iσγ,i+h
′
iZ′2,i}
l
i=1.
Note that it by implicitly sets t = dlog(X1),x = dlog(R1), and zc,i = u
′
iσγ ,i+h
′
i.
Query 2: Same as Query Phase 1.
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Guess: A outputs a guess γ ′. If γ = γ ′, it outputs 0. Otherwise, it outputs 1.
The paradox of dual system encryption is solved since {zc,i} of the ciphertext with a vector x and zk of the
k-th token with a vector σ have the relation zk = ∑i∈S zc,i if fσ (x) = 1. Additionally, the adversary cannot
detect any relationship between {zc,i} of the ciphertext and zk of the k-th token since the function u
′
iσi+ h
′
i
is a pairwise independent function. This completes our proof.
Lemma 6.2.4. If the Assumption 3 holds, then no polynomial-time adversary can distinguish between
Game2 and Game3 with a non-negligible advantage.
Proof. For the proof of this lemma, we define a sequence of games Game2,0,Game2,1, . . . ,Game2,l where
Game2,0 = Game2. In Game2,i, the semi-functional ciphertext components {C2, j}
i
j=1 are replaced by
random elements in Gp1p2p4 . It is obvious that Game2,l is equal with Game3.
Suppose there exists an adversary A that distinguishes between Game2,k−1 and Game2,k with a non-
negligible advantage. A simulator B that solves the Assumption 3 using A is given: a challenge tuple D =
((n,G,GT ,e),gp1 ,gp2 ,gp3 ,gp4 ,g
a
p1
Z1,g
a
p1
Y1R1,Y2R1,g
b
p1
Z2R2) and T where T = g
ab
p1
Z3R3 or T = g
c
p1
Z3R3.
Then B that interacts with A is described as follows.
Setup: B first chooses random exponents {u′i,h
′
i}
l
i=1,α ∈ Zn. It selects Zv,{Zu,i,Zh,i}
l
i=1 ∈ Gp2 and pub-
lishes a public key as
V = gp1Zv, ∀i≤ k :Ui = (g
a
p1
Z1)
u′iZu,i, ∀i> k :Ui = g
u′i
p1Zu,i,
{Hi = g
h′i
p1Zh,i}
l
i=1, Z = gp2 , Ω = e(gp1 ,gp1)
α .
Query 1: A adaptively requests a token query for a vector σ = (σ1, . . . ,σl). B selects random exponents
r,w ∈ Zn, and random elements Y
′
1,Y
′
2 ∈Gp3 . Then it outputs a semi-functional token as
K1 = g
α
p1
(∏
i∈S1
(gap1Y1R1)
u′iσihi)
r(∏
i∈S2
g
u′iσi
p1 hi)
r(Y2R1)
rwY ′1, K2 = g
r
p1
(Y2R1)
rY ′2.
Note that it implicitly sets y= dlog(R1)r and zk = ∑i∈S1 u
′
iσi+w.
Challenge: A submits two vectors x0,x1 and two messages M0,M1. B flips a random coin γ internally, and
it chooses a random exponent t ∈Zn, random elements Z1,Z2 ∈Gp2 . Then it outputs a semi-functional
ciphertext as
C0 = e(g
b
p1
Z2R2,gp1)
αMγ , C1 = (g
b
p1
Z2R2)Z
′
1, ∀i< k :C2,i = Pi(Z3R3)Z
′
2,i,
C2,k = T
u′kσk+h
′
kZ′2,i, ∀i> k :C2,i = (g
b
p1
Z2R2)
u′iσi+h
′
iZ′2,i.
If T = gabp1Z3R3, then B is playing Game2. Otherwise, it is playing Game3. Note that it implicitly
sets t = b,x= dlog(R2), and zc,i = u
′
iσi+h
′
i.
Query 2: Same as Query Phase 1.
Guess: A outputs a guess γ ′. If γ = γ ′, it outputs 0. Otherwise, it outputs 1.
This completes our proof.
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Lemma 6.2.5. If the Assumption 4 holds, then no polynomial-time adversary can distinguish between
Game3 and Game4 with a non-negligible advantage.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A that distinguishes between Game2 and Game3 with a non-
negligible advantage. A simulator B that solves the Assumption 3 using A is given: a challenge tuple
D = ((n,G,GT ,e),gp1 ,gp2 ,gp3 ,gp4 ,g
a
p1
R1,g
b
p1
R2) and T where T = e(gp1 ,gp1)
ab or T = e(gp1 ,gp1)
c. Then
B that interacts with A is described as follows.
Setup: B first chooses random elements {ui,hi}
l
i=1 ∈ Gp1 . It implicitly sets α = a and publishes a public
key using Zv,{Zu,i,Zh,i}
l
i=1 ∈Gp2 as
V = gp1Zv, {Ui = uiZu,i, Hi = hiZu,i}, Z = gp2 , Ω = e(gp1 ,g
a
p1
R1).
Query 1: A adaptively requests a token query for a vector σ . B selects random exponents r,z′k ∈ Zn and a
random element R′1 ∈ Gp4 . Then it outputs a semi-functional token using random elements Y
′
1,Y
′
2 ∈
Gp3 as
K1 = (g
a
p1
R1)(∏
i∈S
u
σi
i hi)
r(R′1)
z′kY ′1, K2 = g
r
p1
(R′1)Y
′
2.
Note that it implicitly sets y= dlog(R′1) and zk = dlog(R1)/dlog(R
′
1)+ z
′
k.
Challenge: A submits two vectors x0,x1 and two messages M0,M1. B flips a random coin γ internally, and
it chooses a random exponent {wi}
l
i=1 ∈ Zn and random elements Z
′
1,{Z2,i}
l
i=1 ∈Gp2 . Then it outputs
a semi-functional ciphertext with randomized {C2,i} components by implicitly setting t = b as
C0 = TMγ , C1 = (g
b
p1
R2)Z
′
1, {C2,i = (g
b
p1
R2)
wiZ′2,i}
l
i=1.
If T = e(gp1 ,gp1)
ab, then B is playing Game3. Otherwise, it is playing Game4.
Query 2: Same as Query Phase 1.
Guess: A outputs a guess γ ′. If γ = γ ′, it outputs 0. Otherwise, it outputs 1.
This completes our proof.
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Chapter 7
Applications
In this chapter, we show that the HVE scheme supports conjunctive equality, conjunctive comparison, con-
junctive range, and conjunctive range queries on encrypted data. The constructions of this chapter are based
on [13].
7.1 Conjunctive Equality Queries
It is trivial to construct a searchable encryption system that supports conjunctive equality queries since the
HVE scheme naturally supports conjunctive equality queries. Therefore, we omits the construction.
7.2 Conjunctive Comparison Queries
Let Σ01 = {0,1} and Σ01∗= {0,1,∗}. Let (SetupHVE ,GenTokenHVE ,EncryptHVE ,QueryHVE) be a secure
HVE scheme over Σnw01 where l = nw. The searchable encryption for conjunctive comparison queries is
described as follows.
Setup(1λ ,n,w): The setup runs SetupHVE(1
λ ,nw).
GenToken( fa,SK,PK): The token generation algorithm takes as input a predicate with a vector a=(a1, . . . ,aw)
∈ {1, . . . ,n}w and the secret key SK. It first defines σ∗(a) = (σi, j) ∈ Σ
nw
01∗ as follows:
σi, j =
{
1 if xi = j,
∗ otherwise
It outputs GenTokenHVE(σ∗(a),SK,PK) where the token size is O(w).
Encrypt(b,M,PK): The encryption algorithm takes as input a vector b= (b1, . . . ,bw) ∈ {1, . . . ,n}
w, a mes-
sage M ∈M, and the public key PK. It first defines a vector x(b) = (xi, j) ∈ Σ
nw
01 as follows:
xi, j =
{
1 if j ≥ xi,
0 otherwise
Then it outputs EncryptHVE(σ ,M,PK) where the ciphertext size is O(nw).
Query(CT,TKa,PK): The query algorithm outputs QueryHVE(CT,TKa).
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7.3 Conjunctive Range Queries
In previous section, we constructed a searchable encryption system that support comparison queries such
that x≤ a where the ciphertext contains x and the token contains a. It is easy to support comparison queries
such that x≥ b by changing bit value of the ciphertext. Therefore, we can construct a searchable encryption
system that support range queries by combining two comparison queries as x≤ a∧x≥ bwhere the ciphertext
contains the pair (x,x).
7.4 Subset Queries
Let T be a set of size n. For a subset A⊆ T , we define a subset predicate as follows:
fA(x) =
{
1 if x ∈ A,
0 otherwise
The conjunctive subset predicates are naturally defined. Let Σ01= {0,1} and Σ01∗= {0,1,∗}. Let (SetupHVE ,
GenTokenHVE ,EncryptHVE ,QueryHVE) be a secure HVE scheme over Σ
nw
01 where l = nw. The searchable
encryption for conjunctive subset queries is described as follows.
Setup(1λ ,n,w): The setup runs SetupHVE(1
λ ,nw).
GenToken( fA,SK,PK): The token generation algorithm takes as input a predicate with a vector A =
(A1, . . . ,Aw) and the secret key SK. It first defines σ∗(A) = (σi, j) ∈ Σ
nw
01∗ as follows:
σi, j =
{
0 if j /∈ Ai,
∗ otherwise
It outputs GenTokenHVE(σ∗(A),SK,PK) where the token size is O(nw).
Encrypt(b,M,PK): The encryption algorithm takes as input a vector b = (b1, . . . ,bw) ∈ T
w, a message
M ∈M, and the public key PK. It first defines a vector x(b) = (xi, j) ∈ Σ
nw
01 as follows:
xi, j =
{
1 if xi = j,
0 otherwise
Then it outputs EncryptHVE(x,M,PK) where the ciphertext size is O(nw).
Query(CT,TKA,PK): The query algorithm outputs QueryHVE(CT,TKA).
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Chapter 8
Generic Group Model
8.1 Overview
In this chapter, we prove that the new assumption of this thesis is secure under the generic group model.
The generic group model was introduced by Shoup [37]. The generic group model is a tool for analyzing
generic algorithms that work independently of the group representation. In the generic group model, an
adversary is given a random encoding of a group element or an arbitrary index of a group element instead of
an actual representation of a group element. Thus, the adversary performs group operations through oracles
that provided by a simulator, and the adversary only can check the equality of group elements. The detailed
explanation of the generic group model is given in [6, 24].
The master theorems that can be used for the analysis of assumptions in bilinear groups were presented
in [6, 16, 24]. However, the new assumption of this paper can not be analyzed by the previous master
theorems. The reason of this difficulty is that the new assumption is based on symmetric bilinear groups of
prime order, the target group of our assumption is G instead of GT , and the target consists of many group
elements instead of just one.
8.2 Master Theorem
To analyze the new assumption of this paper, we generalize the master theorem of Katz et al. [24] to use
prime order bilinear groups instead of composite order bilinear groups and to use multiple groups elements
in the target instead of just one element.
Let G,GT be cyclic bilinear groups of order p where p is a large prime. The bilinear map is defined
as e : G×G→ GT . In the generic group model, a random group element of G,GT is represented as a
random variable Pi,Ri respectively where Pi,Ri are chosen uniformly in Zp. We say that a random variable
has degree t if the maximum degree of any variable is t. Then we can naturally define the dependence and
independence of random variables as in Definition 8.2.1.
Definition 8.2.1. Let P= {P1, . . . ,Pu}, T0 = {T0,1, . . . ,T0,m}, T1 = {T1,1, . . . ,T1,m} be random variables over
G where T0,i 6= T1,i for all 1≤ i≤ m, and let R= {R1, . . . ,Rv} be random variables over GT . We say that Tb
is dependent on A if there exists constants {αi},{βi} such that
m
∑
i
αiTb,i =
u
∑
i
βi ·Pi
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where αi 6= 0 for at least one i. We say that Tb is independent of P if Tb is not dependent on P.
Let S1 = {(i, j) | e(T0,i,T0, j) 6= e(T1,i,T1, j)} and S2 = {(i, j) | e(T0,i,Pj) 6= e(T1,i,Pj)}. We say that
{e(Tb,i,Tb, j)}(i, j)∈S1 ∪{e(Tb,i,Pj)}(i, j)∈S2 is dependent on P∪R∪{e(Tb,i,Tb, j)}(i, j)/∈S1 ∪{e(Tb,i,Pj)}(i, j)/∈S2 if
there exist constants {αi, j},{α
′
i, j},{βi, j},{β
′
i, j},{γi, j},{δi} such that
∑
(i, j)∈S1
αi, j · e(Tb,i,Tb, j)+ ∑
(i, j)/∈S1
α ′i, j · e(Tb,i,Tb, j)+ ∑
(i, j)∈S2
βi, j · e(Tb,i,Pj)+ ∑
(i, j)/∈S2
β ′i, j · e(Tb,i,Pj)
=
u
∑
i
u
∑
j
γi, j · e(Pi,Pj)+
v
∑
i
δi ·Ri.
where αi, j 6= 0 for at least one (i, j)∈ S1 or βi, j 6= 0 for at least one (i, j)∈ S2. We say that {e(Tb,i,Tb, j)}(i, j)∈S1∪
{e(Tb,i,Pj)}(i, j)∈S2 is independent of P∪R∪{e(Tb,i,Tb, j)}(i, j)/∈S1∪{e(Tb,i,Pj)}(i, j)/∈S2 if {e(Tb,i,Tb, j)}(i, j)∈S1∪
{e(Tb,i,Pj)}(i, j)∈S2 is not dependent on P∪R∪{e(Tb,i,Tb, j)}(i, j)/∈S1 ∪{e(Tb,i,Pj)}(i, j)/∈S2 .
Using the above dependence and independence of random variables, we can generalize the master theo-
rem of Katz et al. as Theorem 8.2.1.
Theorem 8.2.1. [24] Let P= {P1, . . . ,Pu}, T0 = {T0,1, . . . ,T0,m}, T1 = {T1,1, . . . ,T1,m} be random variables
over G where T0,i 6= T1,i for all 1≤ i≤ m, and let R= {R1, . . . ,Rv} be random variables over GT . Consider
the following experiment in the generic group model:
An algorithm is given P = {P1, . . . ,Pu} and R = {R1, . . . ,Rv}. A random bit b is chosen, and
the adversary is given Tb = {Tb,1, . . . ,Tb,m}. The algorithm outputs a bit b
′, and succeeds if
b′ = b. The algorithm’s advantage is the absolute value of the difference between its success
probability and 1/2.
Let S1= {(i, j) | e(T0,i,T0, j) 6= e(T1,i,T1, j)} and S2 = {(i, j) | e(T0,i,Pj) 6= e(T1,i,Pj)}. If Tb is independent of P
for all b∈{0,1}, and {e(Tb,i,Tb, j)}(i, j)∈S1∪{e(Tb,i,Pj)}(i, j)∈S2 is independent of P∪R∪{e(Tb,i,Tb, j)}(i, j)/∈S1∪
{e(Tb,i,Pj)}(i, j)/∈S2 for all b ∈ {0,1}, then any algorithm A issuing at most q instructions has an advantage
at most O(q2t/p).
The master theorem of Katz et al. still holds in prime order bilinear groups since the dependent equation
of an adversary can be used to distinguish the target Tb of the assumption. Additionally, it still holds when
the target consists of multiple group elements since the adversary can only make a dependent equation in
Definition 8.2.1.
8.3 Analysis of Our Assumptions
To prove that our assumption holds in the generic group model by applying the master theorem of previous
section, we only need to show the independence of T0,T1 random variables.
8.3.1 P3DH Assumption
Using the notation of previous section, the decisional P3DH assumption can be written as follows
P= {1,X ,A,XA,B,XB,AB+XZ1,Z1,C+XZ2,Z2}, R= {1}
T0 = {ABC+XZ3,Z3}, T1 = {D+XZ3,Z3}.
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The T1 has a random variable D that does not exists in P. Thus the independence of T1 is easily obtained.
Therefore, we only need to consider the independence of T0. First, T0 is independent of P since T0 contains
Z3 that does not exist in P. For the independence of {e(T0,i,T0, j)}(i, j)∈S1 ∪{e(T0,i,Pj)}(i, j)∈S2 , we should
define two sets S1,S2. We obtain that S1 = {(1,1),(1,2),(2,1),(2,2)}. However, e(T0,i,T0, j) contains Z
2
3
because of Z3 in T0, and Z
2
3 can not be obtained from the right part of the equation in Definition 8.2.1. Thus,
the constants αi, j should be zero for all (i, j). From this, we obtain the simple equations as follows
∑
(i, j)∈S2
βi, j · e(Tb,i,Pj)+ ∑
(i, j)/∈S2
β ′i, j · e(Tb,i,Pj) =
u
∑
i
u
∑
j
γi, j · e(Pi,Pj)+
v
∑
i
δi ·Ri.
The set S2 is defined as {(i, j) | ∀i, j} because of D in T1. However, Z3 in T0 should be removed to
construct a dependent equation since Z3 does not exists in P,R. To remove Z3 from the left part of the above
simple equation, two random variables Y,XY should be paired with T0,i for some Y ∈ P. If Z3 is remove
in the left part of the above simple equation, then the left part has at least a degree 3 and it contains ABC.
To have a degree 3 in the right part of the above simple equation, AB+XZ1,Z1 should be used. However,
the right part of the above equation can not contain ABC since C,XC do not exist in P. Therefore, the
independence of T0 is obtained.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
In this thesis, we proposed efficient HVE schemes with short tokens. We first presented the efficient HVE
schemes that have the constant size of tokens and the constant cost of pairing computations in decryption.
The scheme was based on composite order bilinear groups where the order is a product of three primes. Ad-
ditionally, we constructed a scheme in asymmetric bilinear groups where there are no efficiently computable
isomorphisms between two groups. Next, we presented a general framework that converts HVE schemes
from composite order bilinear groups to prime order bilinear groups. Using this framework, we constructed
HVE schemes that are secure under any kind of pairing types. Finally, we proposed a fully secure HVE
scheme with short tokens in composite order bilinear groups by adapting the dual system encryption tech-
nique.
There are many interesting problems that should be solved. The first one is to construct a delegatable
HVE scheme with short tokens. The delegation property was achieved in hierarchical identity based en-
cryption and attribute based encryption. Though Shi and Waters constructed a delegatable HVE scheme, the
decryption const of their construction is proportional to the number of attributes in tokens. The second one
is to construct a HVE scheme with constant size of ciphertexts. In HIBE, the scheme with constant size of
ciphertexts was proposed. In HVE, it is not easy because the scheme should support wild-card in tokens.
The third one is to construct a fully secure HVE scheme without any restrictions on the capability of the
adversary.
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